Comparison Overview
Upside Engineering Ltd.

Upside Engineering Ltd.
409 10th Avenue S.E., Calgary, Alberta, T2G 0W3, CA
Last Update: 14/11/2025
Hatch Upside is a privately held Calgary-based engineering firm offering full discipline engineering and design services as well as a complete spectrum of procurement and project management services. At Hatch Upside, our people are our strength and they are empowered ...

ConocoPhillips
925 N Eldridge Pkwy, Houston, 77079, US
Last Update: 01/04/2026
We are a global oil and gas company tasked with an important job—to safely find and deliver energy for the world. We’re experts in what we do—from the well site to the office. Across our operations and activities in 13 countries, we never forget our responsibility to ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Upside Engineering Ltd.







ConocoPhillips






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Oil and Gas Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Upside Engineering Ltd. in 2026.
Incidents vs Oil and Gas Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for ConocoPhillips in 2026.
Incident History - Upside Engineering Ltd. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Upside Engineering Ltd. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - ConocoPhillips (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ConocoPhillips cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Upside Engineering Ltd.

ConocoPhillips
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs). Prior to 0.23.1rc0, the fix for CVE-2026-22778, which introduced a sanitize_message helper that strips object-repr memory addresses from error messages before they reach the client, is incomplete: several response paths echo str(exc) directly to clients without calling sanitize_message. The unsanitized sites include the Anthropic API router in vllm/entrypoints/anthropic/api_router.py (the POST /v1/messages and POST /v1/messages/count_tokens handlers), the Server-Sent Events streaming converter in vllm/entrypoints/anthropic/serving.py, and the realtime speech-to-text WebSocket in vllm/entrypoints/speech_to_text/realtime/connection.py. These paths catch the exception inside the route coroutine and construct the JSONResponse themselves, bypassing the sanitizing global FastAPI exception handler, and WebSocket frames do not traverse that handler chain at all. Using the same primitive as the parent issue, an unauthenticated attacker can send malformed image bytes through the Anthropic Messages API image content parts so that PIL.Image.open raises an UnidentifiedImageError whose message contains the BytesIO object repr, leaking the heap memory address verbatim in the error.message field of the response body. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.23.1rc0.
vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs). Prior to 0.23.1rc0, ll temperature validation gates use comparison operators (<, >), which silently evaluate to False for NaN and for positive Infinity in Python's IEEE 754 float semantics. Both values pass every guard and propagate to GPU sampling kernels, where they produce undefined behavior or CUDA errors that can crash the inference worker. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.23.1rc0.
vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs). Prior to 0.23.1rc0, vLLM's /v1/audio/transcriptions endpoint limits compressed upload size but not decoded PCM output. A 25MB OPUS file expands to ~14.9GB of float32 PCM at decode time. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.23.1rc0.
vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs). Prior to 0.22.1, the vLLM Dockerfile is vulnerable to a dependency confusion attack through the flashinfer-jit-cache package. The package is installed from a custom index (flashinfer.ai/whl/) using --extra-index-url, but the package name was not registered on PyPI, and UV_INDEX_STRATEGY="unsafe-best-match" is set globally. An attacker who registers flashinfer-jit-cache on PyPI with version 0.6.11.post2 can execute arbitrary code as root during the Docker build and backdoor every resulting container image, enabling exfiltration of all user prompts, API credentials, and model data from production vLLM deployments This vulnerability is fixed in 0.22.1.
vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs). From 0.5.5 until 0.23.1rc0, integer truncation of tensor dimensions in vLLM's GGUF dequantize kernels (csrc/quantization/gguf/gguf_kernel.cu) causes partial tensor processing. The output tensor is allocated at full size via torch::empty (uninitialized memory), but the dequantize CUDA kernel processes only a truncated number of elements. The unfilled portion of the output tensor retains whatever was previously in GPU memory. In multi-tenant inference deployments, this residual GPU memory may contain tensor data from other users' inference requests, constituting information disclosure. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.23.1rc0.