Comparison Overview
University of South Carolina
University of South Carolina
Columbia, SC, US, 29208
Last Update: 02/04/2026
With thriving academic and research excellence and a lively, welcoming student experience, the University of South Carolina brings the opportunities of higher education to new generations. South Carolina's unrivaled college experience has been sought by students, facul...
University of California, San Francisco
530 Parnassus Ave, San Francisco, California, US, 94122
Last Update: 01/04/2026
UC San Francisco is driven by the idea that when the best research, the best education and the best patient care converge, great breakthroughs are achieved. We pursue this integrated excellence with singular focus, fueled by collaboration among our top-ranked profession...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
University of South Carolina
University of California, San Francisco
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Higher Education Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for University of South Carolina in 2026.
Incidents vs Higher Education Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for University of California, San Francisco in 2026.
Incident History - University of South Carolina (X = Date, Y = Severity)
University of South Carolina cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - University of California, San Francisco (X = Date, Y = Severity)
University of California, San Francisco cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
University of South Carolina
University of California, San Francisco
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.