Comparison Overview
United States Marshals Service

United States Marshals Service
1215 S Clark St, Arlington, 22202, US
Last Update: 04/04/2026
Approximately 4,000 U.S. Marshals and Deputy U.S. Marshals form the backbone of the United States Marshals Service, an agency that has served the United States since 1789. The U.S. Marshals Service serves as the enforcement arm of the federal courts and is involved in v...

SAPS
ZA
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Policing in South Africa. I am attached to the newly formed Directorate for Priority Crime Investigations. Formally I was attached to the Detecitve Service and have been conduction investigations for over 25 years. I have also been attached to the National Inspectorate ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

United States Marshals Service







SAPS






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Law Enforcement Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for United States Marshals Service in 2026.
Incidents vs Law Enforcement Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for SAPS in 2026.
Incident History - United States Marshals Service (X = Date, Y = Severity)
United States Marshals Service cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - SAPS (X = Date, Y = Severity)
SAPS cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

United States Marshals Service

SAPS
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains a path traversal vulnerability in MultiAgentMonitor that fails to sanitize agent IDs when building file paths. Attackers can include traversal sequences like ../ in agent IDs to read, write, or overwrite arbitrary files, enabling sensitive disclosure, denial of service, or code execution.
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MultiAgentLedger component that allows attackers to access sensitive data by registering agents with duplicate IDs. Attackers can exploit the lack of agent ID uniqueness enforcement to share ledger instances and expose system prompts and conversation history between agents.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 contains a cross-origin agent execution vulnerability in the AGUI endpoint that allows remote attackers to trigger arbitrary agent execution. The POST /agui endpoint lacks authentication and hardcodes Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * headers, combined with Starlette's Content-Type-agnostic JSON parsing, enabling attackers to bypass CORS preflight checks via simple requests and exfiltrate sensitive agent responses including tool execution results and environment data.
PraisonAI before 4.5.128 contains an arbitrary shell command execution vulnerability where the UI modules hardcode approval_mode to auto, overriding administrator configuration from PRAISON_APPROVAL_MODE environment variable. Authenticated attackers can instruct the LLM agent to execute arbitrary shell commands via subprocess.run with shell=True, bypassing the manual approval gate and insufficient command sanitization blocklists.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 caches tool approval decisions by tool name only, not by invocation arguments, allowing subsequent execute_command calls to bypass approval prompts. Attackers can exploit this by obtaining initial approval for a benign command, then silently exfiltrate API keys and credentials via subsequent shell commands without user consent.