Comparison Overview
Alma Mater Studiorum – Università di Bologna
Alma Mater Studiorum – Università di Bologna
Via Zamboni, 33, Bologna, Italia, IT, 40126
Last Update: 02/04/2026
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna operates on the principle that every individual carries within themselves a unique and unrepeatable potential. Active listening and dialogue guide the work of the University of Bologna, which promotes, in all its activitie...
University of Arizona
1401 E University, Tucson, Arizona, US, 85721-0066
Last Update: 03/04/2026
The University of Arizona is the leading public research university in the American Southwest and Arizona's only member of the prestigious Association of American Universities. As the state's land-grant university, our research and resources enrich communities around th...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
Alma Mater Studiorum – Università di Bologna
University of Arizona
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Higher Education Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Alma Mater Studiorum – Università di Bologna in 2026.
Incidents vs Higher Education Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for University of Arizona in 2026.
Incident History - Alma Mater Studiorum – Università di Bologna (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Alma Mater Studiorum – Università di Bologna cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - University of Arizona (X = Date, Y = Severity)
University of Arizona cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
Alma Mater Studiorum – Università di Bologna
University of Arizona
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.