Comparison Overview
UL Solutions in India

UL Solutions in India
Kalyani Platina, 3rd Floor, Block I, No. 24, Bengaluru, 560 066, IN
Last Update: 31/01/2026
A global leader in applied safety science, UL Solutions transforms safety, security, and sustainability challenges into opportunities for customers in more than 100 countries. UL Solutions delivers testing, inspection and certification services, together with software p...

Sage
North Park, Newcastle upon Tyne, GB, NE13 9AA
Last Update: 14/09/2026
At Sage, we knock down barriers with information, insights, and tools to help your business flow. We provide businesses with software and services that are simple and easy to use, as we work with you to give you that feeling of confidence. Customers trust our Payroll,...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

UL Solutions in India







Sage






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Software Development Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for UL Solutions in India in 2026.
Incidents vs Software Development Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Sage in 2026.
Incident History - UL Solutions in India (X = Date, Y = Severity)
UL Solutions in India cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Sage (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Sage cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

UL Solutions in India

Sage
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Requesting a user or organization profile page (`GET /{username}`) with an `Accept: application/rss+xml` or `Accept: application/atom+xml` header returned the owner's activity feed without the visibility check that the profile page and the `.rss` and `.atom` routes apply. Anonymous users, restricted users and non-members could confirm the existence of limited or private users and private organizations and read their profile details and public activity, also when `[other] ENABLE_FEED` was disabled. Activity in private repositories was not included.
The Gitea API endpoint for creating push mirrors (`POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/push_mirrors`) checked only whether mirroring was enabled and not the `[mirror] DISABLE_NEW_PUSH` setting that the web interface enforces. A repository administrator could therefore create new push mirrors on instances where the site administrator had disabled them. A push mirror pushes all refs of the repository to a remote chosen by the caller, on each commit or on a schedule.
The Gitea API endpoint `GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/media/{filepath}` wrote files of up to 1 KiB that are stored directly in Git, not in LFS, to the response without the content type and disposition headers Gitea uses for user content. An HTML file committed to a repository was therefore rendered by the browser on the Gitea origin. A user who can push to a repository could run JavaScript in the session of a victim who opens the media URL and act with the victim's permissions.
With `[repository] FORCE_PRIVATE = true`, Gitea creates new repositories as private, but the post-receive hook still applied the `repo.private=false` push option to an empty repository created by push. Any user who can create repositories could make their new repository public in violation of the instance policy. The default configuration is not affected.
The Gitea push mirror API checked whether the repository owner, instead of the requesting user, may use local file system paths. On instances with `[security] IMPORT_LOCAL_PATHS = true`, a repository administrator who is not allowed to import local paths could add a push mirror to a local path on the server when the repository owner has that permission. Gitea then pushed the repository's refs into an existing Git repository at that path with the permissions of the Gitea process.