Comparison Overview
University of California, Davis

University of California, Davis
1 Shields Ave, Davis, California, US, 95616
Last Update: 05/04/2026
UC Davis was founded in 1908 to serve the state of California. We do and we always will. Today, that seed planted years ago has grown into one of the world’s top universities. UC Davis has a community of faculty and staff who are leading the way in teaching, research, ...

Universidade Paulista
Av. Paulista, 900, São Paulo, São Paulo, BR
Last Update: 02/04/2026
A UNIP promove, em todas as áreas da educação, a formação atualizada dos alunos e sua capacitação para uma sociedade em constante mudança, por meio de um ensino de qualidade, tecnologicamente avançado e dirigido para o futuro. Sua finalidade maior é promover o desenvol...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

University of California, Davis







Universidade Paulista






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Higher Education Industry Avg (This Year)
University of California, Davis has 25.0% more incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incidents vs Higher Education Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Universidade Paulista in 2026.
Incident History - University of California, Davis (X = Date, Y = Severity)
University of California, Davis cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Universidade Paulista (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Universidade Paulista cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

University of California, Davis

Universidade Paulista
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.