Comparison Overview
Trio-Tech International

Trio-Tech International
16139 Wyandotte Street, Van Nuys, 91406, US
Last Update: 04/04/2026
Founded in 1958, Trio-Tech International (NYSE MKT: TRT) is a leading provider of semiconductor testing services, manufacturing solutions, and value-added distribution services. The Company’s diversified business segments include Semiconductor Back-End Solutions and I...

Molex
2222 Wellington Court, Lisle, IL, US, 60532
Last Update: 12/09/2026
Molex makes a connected world possible by enabling technologies that transform the future and improve lives. With a presence in more than 40 countries, Molex offers a complete range of connectivity products, services and solutions for the data communications, medical, i...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Trio-Tech International







Molex






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Appliances, Electrical, and Electronics Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
Trio-Tech International has 51.69% fewer incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incidents vs Appliances, Electrical, and Electronics Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Molex in 2026.
Incident History - Trio-Tech International (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Trio-Tech International cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Molex (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Molex cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Trio-Tech International

Molex
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.