Comparison Overview
Travis Baker

Travis Baker
Trinity Point, Halesowen, B63 3HY, GB
Last Update: 08/12/2025
Travis Baker was established in 2006 to provide a high quality consultancy, concentrated on the development sector. Our approach is very much client focused, and we pride ourselves in maintaining long standing professional relationships with our clients. All of ...

MRV
Av. Prof. Mario Werneck, 621, Belo Horizonte, 30.455-610, BR
Last Update: 02/04/2026
Some 45 years ago, we set out with the ambitious goal of providing affordable housing, working to make Brazilian dreams come true. Over the last few years, we have crafted and shaped our story, becoming a brand-leading platform that offers a variety of housing solutions...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Travis Baker







MRV






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Civil Engineering Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Travis Baker in 2026.
Incidents vs Civil Engineering Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for MRV in 2026.
Incident History - Travis Baker (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Travis Baker cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - MRV (X = Date, Y = Severity)
MRV cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Travis Baker

MRV
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains a path traversal vulnerability in MultiAgentMonitor that fails to sanitize agent IDs when building file paths. Attackers can include traversal sequences like ../ in agent IDs to read, write, or overwrite arbitrary files, enabling sensitive disclosure, denial of service, or code execution.
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MultiAgentLedger component that allows attackers to access sensitive data by registering agents with duplicate IDs. Attackers can exploit the lack of agent ID uniqueness enforcement to share ledger instances and expose system prompts and conversation history between agents.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 contains a cross-origin agent execution vulnerability in the AGUI endpoint that allows remote attackers to trigger arbitrary agent execution. The POST /agui endpoint lacks authentication and hardcodes Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * headers, combined with Starlette's Content-Type-agnostic JSON parsing, enabling attackers to bypass CORS preflight checks via simple requests and exfiltrate sensitive agent responses including tool execution results and environment data.
PraisonAI before 4.5.128 contains an arbitrary shell command execution vulnerability where the UI modules hardcode approval_mode to auto, overriding administrator configuration from PRAISON_APPROVAL_MODE environment variable. Authenticated attackers can instruct the LLM agent to execute arbitrary shell commands via subprocess.run with shell=True, bypassing the manual approval gate and insufficient command sanitization blocklists.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 caches tool approval decisions by tool name only, not by invocation arguments, allowing subsequent execute_command calls to bypass approval prompts. Attackers can exploit this by obtaining initial approval for a benign command, then silently exfiltrate API keys and credentials via subsequent shell commands without user consent.