Comparison Overview
TRACTEBEL

TRACTEBEL
Boulevard Simon Bolivar 34-36, Brussels, Brussels, 1000, BE
Last Update: 12/01/2026
Tractebel is a global engineering and consulting company delivering integrated solutions for sustainable energy and built environment projects. Our expertise is trusted worldwide across multiple markets like nuclear, renewables, power & gas, electrical grids, hydropow...

ST Engineering
ST Engineering Hub, Singapore, 567710, SG
Last Update: 30/03/2026
At ST Engineering, we apply our technology and innovation to solve real-world problems and improve lives. Our commitment to excellence and our track record as a global technology, defence, and engineering company earns us a reputation for quality and trust. Subsc...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

TRACTEBEL







ST Engineering






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Engineering Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for TRACTEBEL in 2026.
Incidents vs Engineering Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for ST Engineering in 2026.
Incident History - TRACTEBEL (X = Date, Y = Severity)
TRACTEBEL cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - ST Engineering (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ST Engineering cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

TRACTEBEL

ST Engineering
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains a path traversal vulnerability in MultiAgentMonitor that fails to sanitize agent IDs when building file paths. Attackers can include traversal sequences like ../ in agent IDs to read, write, or overwrite arbitrary files, enabling sensitive disclosure, denial of service, or code execution.
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MultiAgentLedger component that allows attackers to access sensitive data by registering agents with duplicate IDs. Attackers can exploit the lack of agent ID uniqueness enforcement to share ledger instances and expose system prompts and conversation history between agents.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 contains a cross-origin agent execution vulnerability in the AGUI endpoint that allows remote attackers to trigger arbitrary agent execution. The POST /agui endpoint lacks authentication and hardcodes Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * headers, combined with Starlette's Content-Type-agnostic JSON parsing, enabling attackers to bypass CORS preflight checks via simple requests and exfiltrate sensitive agent responses including tool execution results and environment data.
PraisonAI before 4.5.128 contains an arbitrary shell command execution vulnerability where the UI modules hardcode approval_mode to auto, overriding administrator configuration from PRAISON_APPROVAL_MODE environment variable. Authenticated attackers can instruct the LLM agent to execute arbitrary shell commands via subprocess.run with shell=True, bypassing the manual approval gate and insufficient command sanitization blocklists.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 caches tool approval decisions by tool name only, not by invocation arguments, allowing subsequent execute_command calls to bypass approval prompts. Attackers can exploit this by obtaining initial approval for a benign command, then silently exfiltrate API keys and credentials via subsequent shell commands without user consent.