Comparison Overview
Ministère du Tourisme du Québec (MTO)

Ministère du Tourisme du Québec (MTO)
900 Boulevard René-Lévesque Est, Québec, G1R 2B5, CA
Last Update: 03/01/2026
Le ministère du Tourisme a pour mission de soutenir le développement et la promotion du tourisme au Québec et la concertation et le partenariat des intervenants associés à ce développement et à cette promotion. Cette page est administrée selon la nétiquette du Ministèr...

U.S. Department of Education
400 Maryland Avenue SW, Washington, 20202, US
Last Update: 14/09/2026
Our mission is to promote student achievement and preparation for global competitiveness by fostering educational excellence and ensuring equal access. ED is dedicated to: • Establishing policies on federal financial aid for education, and distributing as well as mon...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Ministère du Tourisme du Québec (MTO)







U.S. Department of Education






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Government Administration Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Ministère du Tourisme du Québec (MTO) in 2026.
Incidents vs Government Administration Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for U.S. Department of Education in 2026.
Incident History - Ministère du Tourisme du Québec (MTO) (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Ministère du Tourisme du Québec (MTO) cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - U.S. Department of Education (X = Date, Y = Severity)
U.S. Department of Education cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Ministère du Tourisme du Québec (MTO)

U.S. Department of Education
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.