Comparison Overview
Total Cyber-Sec

Total Cyber-Sec
Camino a Santa Teresa 187C, 14010, Parques del Pedregal, CDMX, 14000, MX
Last Update: 22/03/2026
Somos una empresa de Grupo Salinas con un equipo de profesionales en Seguridad de la Información con más de 15 años de experiencia que nos respalda en los sectores: financieros, retail, telecomunicaciones, entre otros. Nuestra misión es brindar a nuestros clientes solu...

Capgemini
Place de l'Étoile, Paris, 75017, FR
Last Update: 14/09/2026
Capgemini is an AI-powered global business and technology transformation partner, delivering tangible business value. We imagine the future of organizations and make it real with AI, technology and people. With our strong heritage of nearly 60 years, we are a responsibl...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Total Cyber-Sec







Capgemini






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Total Cyber-Sec in 2026.
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Capgemini in 2026.
Incident History - Total Cyber-Sec (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Total Cyber-Sec cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Capgemini (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Capgemini cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Total Cyber-Sec

Capgemini
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A vulnerability was identified in Anil-matcha Open-Generative-AI up to 1.0.11/2.0.0. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file /api/upload-binary of the component S3 Upload. Such manipulation of the argument x-proxy-target-url leads to unrestricted upload. The attack may be launched remotely. The name of the patch is f013270957f75e439eaf97eb2a93decb32a4543e. Applying a patch is advised to resolve this issue.
- https://github.com/Anil-matcha/Open-Generative-AI/
- https://github.com/Anil-matcha/Open-Generative-AI/commit/f013270957f75e439eaf97eb2a93decb32a4543e
- https://github.com/Anil-matcha/Open-Generative-AI/issues/310
- https://vuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-90603
- https://vuldb.com/submit/914005
- https://vuldb.com/vuln/403185
- https://vuldb.com/vuln/403185/cti
A vulnerability was determined in Anil-matcha Open-Generative-AI up to 1.0.11/2.0.0. Affected by this vulnerability is the function renderHistory of the file ImageStudio.js of the component Studio Components. This manipulation causes cross site scripting. The attack may be initiated remotely. The pull request to fix this issue awaits acceptance.
A vulnerability was found in getzep graphiti up to 0.30.2. Affected is an unknown function of the file server/graph_service/main.py of the component REST API. The manipulation results in improper authentication. The attack can be launched remotely. The pull request to fix this issue awaits acceptance.
A vulnerability has been found in itsourcecode Sales and Inventory System 1.0. This impacts an unknown function of the file /pages/inv_edit1.php. The manipulation of the argument ID leads to sql injection. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
The mcumgr SMP settings-management group handlers settings_mgmt_read(), settings_mgmt_write(), and settings_mgmt_delete() in subsys/mgmt/mcumgr/grp/settings_mgmt/src/settings_mgmt.c allocate a key_name buffer (and, for read, a data buffer) via k_malloc() when CONFIG_MCUMGR_GRP_SETTINGS_BUFFER_TYPE_HEAP is enabled, relying on the end: label to k_free() them. When CONFIG_MCUMGR_GRP_SETTINGS_ACCESS_HOOK is also enabled and the application access hook rejects a request by returning status MGMT_CB_ERROR_RC, the handler executed return ret_rc; directly, bypassing end: and leaking the heap allocation on every rejected request. The settings handlers are reachable over the unauthenticated SMP transport (Bluetooth LE, UART, or UDP, depending on product configuration). The access hook is the mechanism applications use to deny unauthorized settings access, and MGMT_CB_ERROR_RC is a common rejection style, so an attacker who can send settings read/write/delete commands that the hook rejects triggers a heap leak on each attempt. Because the leaked memory is never reclaimed until reboot, a sustained stream of rejected requests monotonically exhausts the kernel heap until k_malloc() fails, denying mcumgr service and impacting any other heap consumer on the device — a denial of service. The impact is availability-only; there is no memory corruption or information disclosure. Only configurations that select the heap buffer type, enable the access hook, and register a hook that returns MGMT_CB_ERROR_RC are affected (the default stack buffer type cannot leak).