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Comparison Overview

Toronto Police ServiceToronto Police Service
VS
SAPSSAPS
Toronto Police Service

Toronto Police Service

40 College St, Toronto, M5G 2J3, CA

Last Update: 04/05/2026

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703/1000Moderate

The Toronto Police Service is the fourth largest municipal police service in North America with over 5500 officers and 2200 civilian support staff. The Service enjoys a well-earned reputation as a world leader in policing and is committed to excellence, innovation, qua...

NAICS:92212
NAICS Definition:Police Protection
Employees:2,805
Subsidiaries:0
12-month incidents
1
Known data breaches
1
Attack type number
1
SAPS

SAPS

ZA

Last Update: 01/04/2026

View Profile
Between 800 and 849
http://www.saps.gov.za
849/1000Good

Policing in South Africa. I am attached to the newly formed Directorate for Priority Crime Investigations. Formally I was attached to the Detecitve Service and have been conduction investigations for over 25 years. I have also been attached to the National Inspectorate ...

NAICS:92212
NAICS Definition:Police Protection
Employees:15,451
Subsidiaries:0
12-month incidents
0
Known data breaches
0
Attack type number
0

Compliance Ranges Comparison

Based On Specific Ai Models Category
Toronto Police Service

Toronto Police Service

-
ISO 27001Not verified
ISO 27001
-
SOC2 Type 1Not verified
SOC2 Type 1
-
SOC2 Type 2Not verified
SOC2 Type 2
-
GDPRNot verified
GDPR
-
PCI DSSNot verified
PCI DSS
-
HIPAANot verified
HIPAA
SAPS

SAPS

-
ISO 27001Not verified
ISO 27001
-
SOC2 Type 1Not verified
SOC2 Type 1
-
SOC2 Type 2Not verified
SOC2 Type 2
-
GDPRNot verified
GDPR
-
PCI DSSNot verified
PCI DSS
-
HIPAANot verified
HIPAA

Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals

Incidents vs Law Enforcement Industry Avg (This Year)

Toronto Police Service has 42.53% fewer incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.

Incidents

Incidents vs Law Enforcement Industry Avg (This Year)

No incidents recorded for SAPS in 2026.

Incidents

Incident History - Toronto Police Service (X = Date, Y = Severity)

Toronto Police Service cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.

R - Ransomware
C - Cyber Attack
D - Data Breach
V - Vulnerability

Incident History - SAPS (X = Date, Y = Severity)

SAPS cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.

No timeline data available
R - Ransomware
C - Cyber Attack
D - Data Breach
V - Vulnerability

Notable Incidents

Last Cyber / HR Incidents / Global...
Toronto Police Service

Toronto Police Service

Incidents
🔒 Incident : Breach
TOR1777898508
SAPS

SAPS

Incidents
No explicit notable incidents reported.

FAQ

Between Toronto Police Service company and SAPS company, which one has the best AI Cybersecurity Score ?
Between Toronto Police Service company and SAPS company, which one has experienced more cyber incidents in the past ?
Between Toronto Police Service company and SAPS company, which one has experienced more cyber incidents this year ?
Between Toronto Police Service company and SAPS company, which one has experienced at least one ransomware attack ?
Between Toronto Police Service company and SAPS company, which one has experienced at least one data breach ?
Between Toronto Police Service company and SAPS company, which one has experienced at least one targeted cyberattack ?
Between Toronto Police Service company and SAPS company, which one has experienced at least one vulnerability ?
Between Toronto Police Service company and SAPS company, which one holds the most compliance certifications ?
Between Toronto Police Service company and SAPS company, which one holds the fewest compliance certifications ?
Between Toronto Police Service company and SAPS company, which one has the most subsidiaries ?
Between Toronto Police Service company and SAPS company, which one has the largest number of employees ?
Between Toronto Police Service and SAPS, which company holds both SOC 2 Type 1 certifications ?
Between Toronto Police Service and SAPS, which company holds both SOC 2 Type 2 certifications ?
Which company is ISO 27001 certified - Toronto Police Service or SAPS ?
Which company is PCI DSS compliant - Toronto Police Service or SAPS ?
Between Toronto Police Service and SAPS, which company complies with HIPAA regulations for healthcare data ?
Between Toronto Police Service and SAPS, which company complies with GDPR requirements ?

Latest Global CVEs

CVE-2026-55790
SUMMARY

Craft CMS is a content management system (CMS). In versions 5.0.0-RC1 through 5.9.22 and 4.0.0-RC1 through 4.17.15, an attacker with only a GitHub account can plant a JavaScript payload in a craftcms/cms issue title. When a Craft admin uses the CraftSupport widget’s "Give feedback" screen and types a search term that returns the poisoned issue, the payload executes in the admin’s control panel session. No control panel account or elevated privileges are required on the attacker’s side. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.17.16 and 5.9.23.

PUBLISHED
Date2026-07-01
UPDATED
Date2026-07-01
RISK INFORMATION (Score: )
CVSS4
Base Score: 7.4
Complexity: LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
IMPACT SCORE
NA
EXPLOITABILITY
NA
CVE-2026-50284
SUMMARY

Craft CMS is a content management system (CMS). In versions 5.0.0-RC1 through 5.9.21 and 4.0.0-RC1 through 4.17.14, theAssetsController::actionDeleteFolder() only requires the deleteAssets:<volume-uid> permission for the target folder. It never enforces deletePeerAssets:<volume-uid>, even though Assets::deleteFoldersByIds() cascades deletion to every descendant folder and every asset inside, regardless of the uploader's assigned privileges. A low-privilege user who has been granted folder-management rights on a shared volume can therefore destroy assets uploaded by other users (peer assets), bypassing the per-asset peer-permission check that the sibling actionDeleteAsset endpoint correctly applies. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.17.15 and 5.9.22.

PUBLISHED
Date2026-07-01
UPDATED
Date2026-07-01
RISK INFORMATION (Score: )
CVSS4
Base Score: 7.1
Complexity: LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
IMPACT SCORE
NA
EXPLOITABILITY
NA
CVE-2026-50283
SUMMARY

Craft CMS is a content management system (CMS). Versions 5.0.0-RC1 through 5.9.20, and 4.0.0-RC1 through 4.17.13 contain an authorization issue in the AssetsController::actionReplaceFile that can delete a source asset without source delete permission by supplying both assetId and sourceAssetId. AssetsController::actionReplaceFile() supports replacing a target asset file using another existing asset as the source. The action loads: assetId -> $assetToReplace and sourceAssetId -> $sourceAsset, then enforces replace permissions using ($assetToReplace ?: $sourceAsset). When both IDs are provided, this expression resolves to the target asset so no permission check is performed against the source asset volume. When both assets are present, Craft copies the source file into the target and then deletes the source asset. There is no deletion check for for the source asset. An authenticated user who can replace files in one volume can delete assets in another volume where they do not have delete permission, as long as they can obtain a sourceAssetId, leading to broken content references and data loss. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.17.14 and 5.9.21.

PUBLISHED
Date2026-07-01
UPDATED
Date2026-07-01
RISK INFORMATION (Score: )
CVSS4
Base Score: 5.3
Complexity: LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
IMPACT SCORE
NA
EXPLOITABILITY
NA
CVE-2026-14440
SUMMARY

Description: To issue and renew TLS certificates on behalf of customers, Cloudflare's Universal SSL feature automatically manages the CAA RRset for the customer's zone. This auto-managed RRset is permissive by design (e.g. 'issue "letsencrypt.org"' without parameters). On Universal SSL zones, Cloudflare's authoritative DNS serves this auto-managed RRset at query time, superseding any customer-configured CAA records on the zone. When a customer publishes a stricter CAA record using the RFC 8657 accounturi or validationmethods parameters, the Certificate Authority does not observe those parameters when evaluating the served RRset under RFC 8659. As a result, the RFC 8657 account-binding and validation-method-binding protections are not enforced end-to-end on Universal SSL zones. Successful exploitation could result in issuance of a browser-trusted TLS certificate to an attacker, enabling MITM against the affected domain. Exploitation is non-trivial in practice: an attacker would need to hold an ACME account at one of the Certificate Authorities in the served CAA RRset and to simultaneously satisfy domain control validation across the multiple geographically distinct Network Perspectives the CA relies on for Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration. Cloudflare prefixes are anycast-announced from hundreds of locations globally, raising the bar against single-vantage-point BGP hijacks. Any resulting misissuance of a browser-trusted certificate is subject to Certificate Transparency logging required by major browsers, and would be visible to CT monitoring. Mitigation:  Customers requiring strict RFC 8657 enforcement need to disable Universal SSL on the affected zone. Universal SSL's automatic CAA management and customer-set RFC 8657 accounturi and validationmethods enforcement are mutually exclusive by the nature of the issue, so there is no in-product workaround that preserves both.  Certificate Transparency monitoring is recommended for all customers as a general detection control. Credits: David Osipov (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0005-2713-9242), independent researcher

PUBLISHED
Date2026-07-01
UPDATED
Date2026-07-01
RISK INFORMATION (Score: )
CVSS4
Base Score: 7.6
Complexity: HIGH
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
IMPACT SCORE
NA
EXPLOITABILITY
NA
CVE-2026-14422
SUMMARY

Out of bounds read and write in Tint in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.46 allowed a remote attacker to potentially perform out of bounds memory access via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)

PUBLISHED
Date2026-07-01
UPDATED
Date2026-07-01
IMPACT SCORE
NA
EXPLOITABILITY
NA