Comparison Overview
Tippett Moorhead & Haden, an Alera Group Company

Tippett Moorhead & Haden, an Alera Group Company
3200 Park Center Drive, Costa Mesa, 92626, US
Last Update: 26/02/2026
We are a seasoned team of independent executive benefit and risk management experts with over 35 years of Fortune 1000 experience. Tippett Moorhead & Haden serves a wide range of clients including Public & Private Companies, Financial Institutions, Corporate Executives...

Gallagher
2850 Golf Road, Rolling Meadows, 60008, US
Last Update: 10/09/2026
Gallagher, a global insurance brokerage, risk management, and consulting firm, serves communities around the globe, helping clients address risk, protecting assets, and recovering from losses. The products and services we provide keep businesses and institutions running...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Tippett Moorhead & Haden, an Alera Group Company







Gallagher






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Insurance Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Tippett Moorhead & Haden, an Alera Group Company in 2026.
Incidents vs Insurance Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Gallagher in 2026.
Incident History - Tippett Moorhead & Haden, an Alera Group Company (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Tippett Moorhead & Haden, an Alera Group Company cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Gallagher (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Gallagher cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Tippett Moorhead & Haden, an Alera Group Company

Gallagher
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.