Comparison Overview
Tigo Honduras.

Tigo Honduras.
[email protected], Tegucigalpa, Distrito Central 11101, HN
Last Update: 23/04/2026
Somos líderes en la adopción del internet y del estilo de vida digital en Honduras, trabajando para facilitar el crecimiento y la felicidad en la vida de todos. Somos una organización centrada en el cliente, cumpliendo con las expectativas rápidas de los consumidores c...

KPN
Wilhelminakade 123, Rotterdam, Zuid-Holland, NL, 3072 AP
Last Update: 02/04/2026
Welkom bij de LinkedIn pagina van KPN. Sinds jaar en dag maakt KPN technologie toegankelijk. Hier leest u alles over de ontwikkelingen rondom de thema’s die KPN belangrijk vindt, zoals Het Nieuwe Leven & Werken, Veiligheid & Privacy en ICT-infrastructuur. Ook een transp...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Tigo Honduras.







KPN






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Tigo Honduras. in 2026.
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for KPN in 2026.
Incident History - Tigo Honduras. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Tigo Honduras. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - KPN (X = Date, Y = Severity)
KPN cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Tigo Honduras.

KPN
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains a path traversal vulnerability in MultiAgentMonitor that fails to sanitize agent IDs when building file paths. Attackers can include traversal sequences like ../ in agent IDs to read, write, or overwrite arbitrary files, enabling sensitive disclosure, denial of service, or code execution.
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MultiAgentLedger component that allows attackers to access sensitive data by registering agents with duplicate IDs. Attackers can exploit the lack of agent ID uniqueness enforcement to share ledger instances and expose system prompts and conversation history between agents.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 contains a cross-origin agent execution vulnerability in the AGUI endpoint that allows remote attackers to trigger arbitrary agent execution. The POST /agui endpoint lacks authentication and hardcodes Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * headers, combined with Starlette's Content-Type-agnostic JSON parsing, enabling attackers to bypass CORS preflight checks via simple requests and exfiltrate sensitive agent responses including tool execution results and environment data.
PraisonAI before 4.5.128 contains an arbitrary shell command execution vulnerability where the UI modules hardcode approval_mode to auto, overriding administrator configuration from PRAISON_APPROVAL_MODE environment variable. Authenticated attackers can instruct the LLM agent to execute arbitrary shell commands via subprocess.run with shell=True, bypassing the manual approval gate and insufficient command sanitization blocklists.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 caches tool approval decisions by tool name only, not by invocation arguments, allowing subsequent execute_command calls to bypass approval prompts. Attackers can exploit this by obtaining initial approval for a benign command, then silently exfiltrate API keys and credentials via subsequent shell commands without user consent.