Comparison Overview
New York State Thruway Authority

New York State Thruway Authority
200 Southern Blvd, Albany, New York, US, 12209
Last Update: 03/04/2026
Mission: Operate and maintain a reliable, user-fee supported transportation system. Vision: Deliver safe, convenient, and high-quality service across a vital corridor that supports New York’s economy—modernizing to meet evolving customer and partner needs responsibly. ...

AECOM
13355 Noel Road, Dallas, 75240, US
Last Update: 17/09/2026
AECOM is the global infrastructure leader, committed to delivering a better world. As a trusted professional services firm powered by deep technical abilities, we solve our clients’ complex challenges in water, environment, energy, transportation and buildings. Our team...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

New York State Thruway Authority







AECOM






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Civil Engineering Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for New York State Thruway Authority in 2026.
Incidents vs Civil Engineering Industry Avg (This Year)
AECOM has 1.96% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - New York State Thruway Authority (X = Date, Y = Severity)
New York State Thruway Authority cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - AECOM (X = Date, Y = Severity)
AECOM cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

New York State Thruway Authority

AECOM
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.