Comparison Overview
Tập đoàn Tân Hiệp Phát

Tập đoàn Tân Hiệp Phát
219 Đại lộ Bình Dương, Thuận An,, Binh Duong, Binh Duong Province, 700000, VN
Last Update: 19/03/2026
Chào mừng các bạn đến THP. Được thành lập năm 1994, Tập đoàn nước giải khát Tân Hiệp Phát ("THP") là công ty Việt Nam lớn nhất trong ngành hàng Tiêu dùng nhanh (FMCG). THP tự hào phát triển, sản xuất và bán ra thị trường 3 thương hiệu Quốc gia Việt Nam - Trà Thảo mộc D...

Grupo Bimbo
MX
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Grupo Bimbo es la empresa líder en panificación y un jugador relevante en snacks. Hornea +9,000 productos, distribuyéndolos a través de +3.5 millones de puntos de venta con +54,000 rutas. Grupo Bimbo tiene +153,000 colaboradores, +1,500 centros de ventas estratégicame...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Tập đoàn Tân Hiệp Phát







Grupo Bimbo






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Food and Beverage Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Tập đoàn Tân Hiệp Phát in 2026.
Incidents vs Food and Beverage Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Grupo Bimbo in 2026.
Incident History - Tập đoàn Tân Hiệp Phát (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Tập đoàn Tân Hiệp Phát cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Grupo Bimbo (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Grupo Bimbo cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Tập đoàn Tân Hiệp Phát

Grupo Bimbo
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Cline is an autonomous coding agent as an SDK, IDE extension, or CLI assistant. Prior to 3.0.30, the Cline Hub dashboard server launched by the cline dashboard command accepts WebSocket connections on the /browser endpoint without validating the Origin header, and when ROOM_SECRET is unset for local 127.0.0.1 binds, isAuthorizedBrowserRequest() allows attacker-controlled websites to send desktopCommand frames that read workspace state, mutate MCP and provider settings, and trigger command execution when a provider or model is configured. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.30.
CoreWCF is a port of the service side of Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) to .NET Core. In version 1.9.0, CoreWCF SPNEGO SecurityContextToken negotiation can expose the proof key recovered from the RSTR when TransportWithMessageCredential with Windows client credentials and session establishment are used, allowing an observer to impersonate the authenticated Windows principal and decrypt or forge WS-SecureConversation traffic. This issue is fixed in version 1.9.1.
CoreWCF is a port of the service side of Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) to .NET Core. Prior to 1.8.1 and 1.9.1, CoreWCF WS-Security endorsing and supporting signature verification does not ensure the selected ds:Signature covers the expected Security header target, allowing an attacker with one captured signed SOAP envelope to replay arbitrary service operations as the victim principal. This issue is fixed in versions 1.8.1 and 1.9.1.
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/0589692d4b9a41d21b34ac48281e95f6df7f4ce5
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/30aef805270976c42477e3f2a05f4e563d86e247
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/4618f24165ad018ad3ed2636bf8c3bc87d2a3be2
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.8.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.9.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/security/advisories/GHSA-gqv6-pwcg-87r8
CoreWCF is a port of the service side of Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) to .NET Core. Prior to 1.8.1 and 1.9.1, CoreWCF SAML 1.1 and SAML 2.0 token validation does not correctly resolve the issuer signing key or require signed tokens when IdentityConfiguration is used with federated bindings, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to impersonate any principal the trusted STS could issue. This issue is fixed in versions 1.8.1 and 1.9.1.
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/0b8c8af851260e85e8402af53233d1b8f87dfb6f
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/0e63c2cca55763d8be6b226a234579280a09e7b6
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/e5cc9b6a4ecc102a50d782093bfc72e0790abe3d
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.8.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.9.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/security/advisories/GHSA-xjr9-gg9q-jx3v
CoreWCF is a port of the service side of Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) to .NET Core. Prior to 1.8.1 and 1.9.1, CoreWCF SAML token validation does not enforce SubjectConfirmation method URIs or holder-of-key proof keys in SamlSecurityTokenHandler, allowing holder-of-key downgrade or custom confirmation method assertions to authenticate a subject without proving authority over the assertion. This issue is fixed in versions 1.8.1 and 1.9.1.
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/6a99df3242f54acd6f89edfd6050430b72d0c685
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/86dd3232b6b8aaf32281be9e8d798afad6145d58
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/9eb9b46d1c2af06fb71f656a02f4d5b4649c1f03
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.8.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.9.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/security/advisories/GHSA-48pq-2xq3-c2m4