Comparison Overview
THINK Surgical

THINK Surgical
47201 Lakeview Blvd, None, Fremont, CA, US, 94538
Last Update: 28/03/2026
THINK Surgical, Inc., is a privately held U.S.-based technology innovator that develops and markets orthopedic robots. THINK Surgical robots are open platforms providing support for implant brands from multiple manufacturers, enabling the choice of implant to be driven ...

Boston Scientific
100 Boston Scientific Way, Marlborough, 01752, US
Last Update: 09/09/2026
Boston Scientific transforms lives through innovative medical technologies that improve the health of patients around the world. As a global medical technology leader for more than 40 years, we advance science for life by providing a broad range of high-performance solu...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

THINK Surgical







Boston Scientific






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Medical Equipment Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for THINK Surgical in 2026.
Incidents vs Medical Equipment Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
Boston Scientific has 194.12% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - THINK Surgical (X = Date, Y = Severity)
THINK Surgical cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Boston Scientific (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Boston Scientific cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

THINK Surgical

Boston Scientific
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.