Comparison Overview
Think Silicon, an Applied Materials company
Think Silicon, an Applied Materials company
N/A
Last Update: 10/03/2026
Think Silicon, an Applied Materials company, is the leading provider of ultra-low power 2D and 3D GPU and display processors for MCU-based microprocessor cores in embedded systems. 𝐒𝐦𝐚𝐥𝐥 𝐢𝐬 𝐦𝐢𝐠𝐡𝐭𝐲. Our flagship 𝐍𝐄𝐌𝐀® 𝐆𝐏𝐔 𝐈𝐏 can be found in mill...
Samsung Semiconductor
N/A
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Established in 1974 as a subsidiary of Samsung Electronics, we’re proud to be recognized as one of the leading chip manufacturers in the world. Using our knowledge in semiconductor technology, our ambition is to spark the imagination of device manufacturers with top-of-...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
Think Silicon, an Applied Materials company
Samsung Semiconductor
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Semiconductor Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Think Silicon, an Applied Materials company in 2026.
Incidents vs Semiconductor Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
Samsung Semiconductor has 2.91% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Think Silicon, an Applied Materials company (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Think Silicon, an Applied Materials company cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Samsung Semiconductor (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Samsung Semiconductor cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
Think Silicon, an Applied Materials company
Samsung Semiconductor
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A security vulnerability has been detected in adafap api-mcp up to 92b9a5d04acfec165c7d4ef852496593aa87be06. This affects the function customAxios of the file app/api/proxy/route.ts of the component Proxy API Endpoint. The manipulation of the argument url leads to server-side request forgery. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. This product adopts a rolling release strategy to maintain continuous delivery. Therefore, version details for affected or updated releases cannot be specified. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
A weakness has been identified in PhialsBasement KoboldCPP-MCP-Server 1.0.0. Affected by this issue is the function makeRequest of the file src/index.ts of the component BaseConfigSchema. Executing a manipulation of the argument apiUrl can lead to server-side request forgery. It is possible to launch the attack on the local host. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
A security flaw has been discovered in Handwriting-OCR handwriting-ocr-mcp-server 0.1.0. Affected by this vulnerability is the function fs.readFileSync of the file src/index.ts of the component upload_document. Performing a manipulation of the argument File results in path traversal. Attacking locally is a requirement. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
A vulnerability was identified in Nikolaibibo claude-comfyui-mcp 1.0.0. Affected is the function copyFileSync of the file src/tools/utils.ts of the component comfy_upload_image. Such manipulation of the argument image_path leads to path traversal. An attack has to be approached locally. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in nltk/nltk versions 3.9.4 and the current develop branch. The `nltk.pathsec.validate_network_url()` function, intended to prevent SSRF by rejecting internal network addresses, fails to reject IPs in the RFC 6598 shared address space (`100.64.0.0/10`). This occurs because Python's `ipaddress` module does not classify such addresses as `is_private` or `is_global`, and the current guard only checks `is_private` and a few explicit categories. An attacker who can influence a URL passed to NLTK's network-loading helpers can exploit this vulnerability to make a strict-mode application send requests to shared-address-space hosts, potentially exposing non-public infrastructure reachable from the application host. The impact is limited to SSRF-style confidentiality exposure, with no code execution claimed.