Comparison Overview
The Shadowserver Foundation

The Shadowserver Foundation
N/A
Last Update: 14/08/2026
The Shadowserver Foundation is a non-profit watchdog group of security professionals that gather, track, and report on malware, botnet activity, and electronic fraud. It is the mission of the Shadowserver Foundation to improve the security of the Internet by raising awa...

NETWORK-SECURITY-SOLUTIONS
Suwalska 19/1, Poznan, 60-461, PL
Last Update: 30/03/2026
## Our core business We manage linux / unix server infrastructures and build the efficient and secure networking environments using hardware cutting edge technologies suited to the needs of the project and the client. We believe in quality, opposed to quantity. O...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

The Shadowserver Foundation







NETWORK-SECURITY-SOLUTIONS






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Computer and Network Security Industry Avg (This Year)
The Shadowserver Foundation has 5.66% fewer incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incidents vs Computer and Network Security Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for NETWORK-SECURITY-SOLUTIONS in 2026.
Incident History - The Shadowserver Foundation (X = Date, Y = Severity)
The Shadowserver Foundation cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - NETWORK-SECURITY-SOLUTIONS (X = Date, Y = Severity)
NETWORK-SECURITY-SOLUTIONS cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

The Shadowserver Foundation

NETWORK-SECURITY-SOLUTIONS
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
In OpenStack Ironic before 38.0.1, the autodetect deploy interface may fail to run cleaning immediately after enrollment with, or changing to, the autodetect deploy interface.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay. A user with FEATURE_BUILD_SUPPORT enabled and repository write access can exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability within the build API. This allows the user to provide a malicious URL, causing the Quay builder to make requests to internal network addresses. Such an action could lead to the disclosure of sensitive internal information.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay's exported logs feature. An unauthenticated attacker with a valid file ID could download exported action logs without proper authorization. While file IDs are complex, they can be intercepted from plaintext email or webhook callbacks. This vulnerability leads to information disclosure, potentially exposing sensitive data such as usernames, email addresses, IP addresses, and action-specific metadata.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay's Stripe billing webhook handler. This vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker to forge billing events by sending crafted JSON requests to the `/webhooks/stripe` endpoint without validating the Stripe-Signature header. Successful exploitation can lead to the unauthorized resetting of a namespace's build quota to its maximum and trigger unsolicited billing emails to namespace administrators.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay. When the SECURITY_SCANNER_V4_PSK (pre-shared key) is not set, a remote unauthenticated attacker can send POST requests to the security scanner notification endpoint. This allows the attacker to flood the notification queue and inject path traversal characters into Clair API URL paths. The primary consequence is worker resource exhaustion and blind path manipulation on the configured Clair host, potentially leading to a denial of service.