Comparison Overview
The Next Group

The Next Group
L3, 107 Pitt Street, Sydney, 2000, AU
Last Update: 23/11/2025
The Next Group is the parent company for two of Australia's leading recruitment and search firms - The Next Step and The Safe Step. We make great things happen in the world of work by helping organisations build successful teams, and connecting quality talent with new o...

Michael Page
PageGroup, Addlestone, Weybridge, GB, KT15 2QW
Last Update: 06/09/2026
Welcome to the Michael Page global company profile. Michael Page has five decades of expertise in professional services recruitment. We were established in London in 1976, and over this period we've grown organically to become one of the best-known and most respected c...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

The Next Group







Michael Page






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Staffing and Recruiting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for The Next Group in 2026.
Incidents vs Staffing and Recruiting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Michael Page in 2026.
Incident History - The Next Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
The Next Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Michael Page (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Michael Page cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

The Next Group

Michael Page
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.