Comparison Overview
Testing to the Limit

Testing to the Limit
Bell Lane Office Village, Little Chalfont, HP66FA, GB
Last Update: 02/12/2025
Peacock Engineering is planning to take systems testing to a new dramatic level. Within 10 weeks the team is testing IBM’s Maximo and its own Fingertip system to the limits when it uses the two systems to support the team as they cross the Himalayas on motorbikes desig...

AeC
Rua Espírito Santo, 871 - Bairro Centro, Belo Horizonte, 30160-031, BR
Last Update: 02/04/2026
A AeC é apontada consistentemente como a líder brasileira na entrega de soluções de experiência do cliente e gestão de processos terceirizados. Servindo as principais marcas do mercado nacional, conquistou nos três últimos anos a posição de Empresa do Ano de BPO pela ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Testing to the Limit







AeC






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Testing to the Limit in 2026.
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for AeC in 2026.
Incident History - Testing to the Limit (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Testing to the Limit cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - AeC (X = Date, Y = Severity)
AeC cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Testing to the Limit

AeC
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
GNU Savannah Administration Savane through 3.17 uses untrusted data as part of authorization.
- https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/administration/savane.git/tree/frontend/php/file.php?h=release-3.17#n113
- https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/administration/savane.git/tree/frontend/php/file.php?h=release-3.17#n123
- https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48605220
- https://www.fsf.org/news/statement-regarding-gnu-savannah-security-reports
- https://www.hacktron.ai
- https://www.mallory.ai/stories/019ee445-bdd4-7775-93b5-a8faaf5c2eb7
AVideo TopMenu plugin through version 26.0 contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in menu item rendering due to missing output encoding of icon classes, URLs, and text labels. Attackers can inject malicious JavaScript through unescaped menu item fields that execute for all site visitors, potentially stealing session cookies or performing unauthorized actions.
AVideo through version 25.0 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the decryptMessage.json.php endpoint that allows unauthenticated users to decrypt PGP messages. Remote attackers can submit private keys, ciphertext, and passphrases to perform server-side decryption without credentials, exposing key material to logs and enabling resource exhaustion attacks.
AVideo through 29.0 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in the Meet plugin's uploadRecordedVideo.json.php endpoint that derives the target users_id from the uploaded filename without verification. An attacker with knowledge of the Meet shared secret can craft a malicious file upload with a filename containing an arbitrary users_id to invoke passwordless User->login() and establish an authenticated session as any user including admin. Attackers can obtain the Meet shared secret through path-traversal vulnerabilities or timing attacks against checkToken.json.php, then POST a crafted file to uploadRecordedVideo.json.php with a filename like '1-anything.mp4' to hijack admin sessions and gain full account takeover.
AVideo through version 27.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in plugin/Live/test.php that allows authenticated administrators to read arbitrary URLs via the statsURL parameter, which lacks isSSRFSafeURL() validation and accepts requests to private IP ranges and cloud metadata endpoints. Attackers can exploit this by crafting requests to internal services, cloud metadata endpoints like 169.254.169.254, and localhost to retrieve sensitive information including IAM credentials, internal service responses, and network configuration details.