Comparison Overview
Tesco Magyarország

Tesco Magyarország
Kinizsi út 1-3., Budaörs, 2040, HU
Last Update: 13/05/2026
Célunk, hogy napról napra többet tegyünk a vásárlókért, a közösségekért és bolygónkért. Vállalatunk alapításakor egyetlen egyszerű célt tűztünk ki magunk elé: a vásárlók minden igényét kiszolgálni, és így nemcsak jobbá, de egyszerűbbé is tenni az életüket. Ez azóta se...

Primark
PO BOX 644, Dublin, Dublin 1, IE
Last Update: 02/04/2026
Primark is an international fashion retailer employing more than 80,000 colleagues across 17 countries in Europe and the US. Founded in Ireland in 1969 under the Penneys brand, Primark aims to provide affordable choices for everyone, from great quality everyday essentia...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Tesco Magyarország







Primark






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Tesco Magyarország in 2026.
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Primark in 2026.
Incident History - Tesco Magyarország (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Tesco Magyarország cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Primark (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Primark cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Tesco Magyarország

Primark
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
FOSSBilling is a free, open-source billing and client management system. In versions 0.5.6 through 0.7.2, when a `ClientPasswordReset` record already exists for a client (from a previous unexpired reset request), subsequent calls to the `reset_password` guest API endpoint reuse the existing token instead of generating a new one. The 15-minute validity window is anchored to the first request's `created_at` timestamp, not the time of the most recent email. An attacker who obtained the original reset link remains able to use it even after the victim requests a new reset, because the original token is never invalidated or rotated. Version 0.8.0 patches the issue. Some workarounds are available. Configure a reverse proxy (e.g., Nginx, Apache, Cloudflare) to apply per-IP rate limiting to the `/client/reset-password` endpoint to minimize the window of opportunity, and/or manually clear expired `client_password_reset` records from the database after a client reports a suspected compromise.
FOSSBilling is a free, open-source billing and client management system. Versions prior to 0.8.0 allow a low-privileged staff account to grant arbitrary module permissions to itself through the admin API, resulting in persistent privilege escalation. A staff user that only has `staff.create_and_edit_staff` can call `/api/admin/staff/permissions_update` targeting their own account and write any permission structure, bypassing the intended role-based access control boundary. Version 0.8.0 patches the issue. Some workarounds are available. Restrict the `staff.create_and_edit_staff` permission to only highly trusted staff members and/or use a reverse proxy or WAF to restrict access to `/api/admin/staff/permissions_update` to specific trusted roles.
FOSSBilling is a free, open-source billing and client management system. Versions 0.5.3 through 0.7.2 allow authenticated clients to both read and reset API key service secrets for orders that are no longer in an `active` state (e.g., `suspended`, `canceled`). The root cause is missing order-state validation in two client API endpoints, despite an `isActive()` helper already existing in the `Serviceapikey` module and the frontend UI correctly gating access on `order.status == 'active'`. Version 0.8.0 contains a fix. Some workarounds are available. If the `Serviceapikey` module is not needed, uninstall it to remove the affected endpoints. One may also use a reverse proxy or WAF to restrict access to `/api/client/order/service` and `/api/client/serviceapikey/reset` based on application-level order-state logic.
FOSSBilling is a free, open-source billing and client management system. Versions prior to 0.8.0 allow low-privileged staff accounts to perform unauthorized actions via admin API endpoints. The root cause is a combination of the `can_always_access` module flag (which grants all staff access to certain modules) and insufficient permission checks or unsafe parameter handling on individual endpoints. Version 0.8.0 contains a fix. Some workarounds are available. Restrict staff accounts to only those who need access to sensitive settings and/or use a reverse proxy or WAF to restrict access to the affected endpoints to trusted IP addresses or higher-privilege roles.
FOSSBilling is a free, open-source billing and client management system. In versions 0.5.6 through 0.7.2, when the "Require Email Confirmation" setting is enabled, a logged-in client with an unverified email address (`email_approved = 0`) can access all client-area pages (e.g. `/client/balance`, `/client/order/list`, `/client/invoice`) and read real account data, including wallet balances and transaction history. The API-side enforcement correctly restricts unverified clients to only profile-related endpoints, but the page-side enforcement is overly permissive, allowing any request whose path starts with `/client`. Version 0.8.0 contains a fix. No known workarounds that don't involve modifying the source code are available.