Comparison Overview
Tencent

Tencent
Tencent Seafront Towers, Nanshan District, Shenzhen, Guangdong, CN
Last Update: 14/09/2026
Tencent is a world-leading internet and technology company that develops innovative products and services to improve the quality of life of people around the world. Founded in 1998 with its headquarters in Shenzhen, China, Tencent's guiding principle is to use technolo...

PedidosYa
La Cumparsita 1475, 11200 Montevideo, Departamento de Montevideo, Montevideo, Montevideo, UY, 11200
Last Update: 13/09/2026
We’re the delivery market leader in Latin America. Our platform connects over 77.000 restaurants, supermarkets, pharmacies and stores with millions of users. Nowadays we operate in more than 500 cities in Latinamerica. And we are now over 3.400 employees. PedidosYa is ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Tencent







PedidosYa






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Software Development Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Tencent in 2026.
Incidents vs Software Development Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for PedidosYa in 2026.
Incident History - Tencent (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Tencent cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - PedidosYa (X = Date, Y = Severity)
PedidosYa cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Tencent

PedidosYa
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
vLLM through 0.29.0 fails to properly clean up decode-side metadata for rejected inference requests in prefill/decode disaggregated deployments. Remote attackers can submit requests with max_tokens=0 to exhaust decode-worker memory without bound until the worker restarts.
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/v0.29.0/vllm/distributed/kv_transfer/kv_connector/v1/nixl/push_worker.py#L162-L181
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/55677
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vllm-through-0.29.0-memory-exhaustion-via-rejected-requests
redis-parser through 3.0.0 contains a denial of service vulnerability in the RESP protocol parser that allows malicious Redis endpoints to crash the client process through unbounded recursion on nested arrays. Attackers can send crafted RESP byte streams with repeated array headers that exhaust the V8 call stack, causing an uncaught RangeError that terminates the Node.js process without triggering error handling callbacks.
- https://github.com/NodeRedis/node-redis-parser
- https://github.com/NodeRedis/node-redis-parser/blob/701655430f5f7d9ca00892a02f7eefcbc1193a98/lib/parser.js#L204-L213
- https://github.com/NodeRedis/node-redis-parser/blob/701655430f5f7d9ca00892a02f7eefcbc1193a98/lib/parser.js#L291-L306
- https://github.com/redis/ioredis/issues/2108
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/redis-parser-through-3.0.0-denial-of-service-via-unbounded-recursion
Improper neutralization of special elements in output used by a downstream component ('injection') in Azure Cosmos DB allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.
Server-side request forgery (ssrf) in Azure AI Foundry allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.
Missing authentication for critical function in Azure AI Foundry allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.