Comparison Overview
Tempel a Worthington Steel Company

Tempel a Worthington Steel Company
5500 North Wolcott Avenue, Chicago, IL, US, 60640
Last Update: 10/03/2026
With over 75+ years of experience, we're a leading manufacturer of high-precision magnetic steel laminations for autos, motors, generators, transformers and beyond.

Vedanta Group
Vedanta Resources, London, GB
Last Update: 08/09/2026
We operate on the belief that our people are our core assets and we consistently endeavour towards developing their potential to be our future leaders and key employees. We currently operate in India, South Africa, Liberia and Namibia, through our various subsidiaries. ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Tempel a Worthington Steel Company







Vedanta Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Tempel a Worthington Steel Company in 2026.
Incidents vs Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
Vedanta Group has 0.99% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Tempel a Worthington Steel Company (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Tempel a Worthington Steel Company cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Vedanta Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Vedanta Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Tempel a Worthington Steel Company

Vedanta Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Requesting a user or organization profile page (`GET /{username}`) with an `Accept: application/rss+xml` or `Accept: application/atom+xml` header returned the owner's activity feed without the visibility check that the profile page and the `.rss` and `.atom` routes apply. Anonymous users, restricted users and non-members could confirm the existence of limited or private users and private organizations and read their profile details and public activity, also when `[other] ENABLE_FEED` was disabled. Activity in private repositories was not included.
The Gitea API endpoint for creating push mirrors (`POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/push_mirrors`) checked only whether mirroring was enabled and not the `[mirror] DISABLE_NEW_PUSH` setting that the web interface enforces. A repository administrator could therefore create new push mirrors on instances where the site administrator had disabled them. A push mirror pushes all refs of the repository to a remote chosen by the caller, on each commit or on a schedule.
The Gitea API endpoint `GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/media/{filepath}` wrote files of up to 1 KiB that are stored directly in Git, not in LFS, to the response without the content type and disposition headers Gitea uses for user content. An HTML file committed to a repository was therefore rendered by the browser on the Gitea origin. A user who can push to a repository could run JavaScript in the session of a victim who opens the media URL and act with the victim's permissions.
With `[repository] FORCE_PRIVATE = true`, Gitea creates new repositories as private, but the post-receive hook still applied the `repo.private=false` push option to an empty repository created by push. Any user who can create repositories could make their new repository public in violation of the instance policy. The default configuration is not affected.
The Gitea push mirror API checked whether the repository owner, instead of the requesting user, may use local file system paths. On instances with `[security] IMPORT_LOCAL_PATHS = true`, a repository administrator who is not allowed to import local paths could add a push mirror to a local path on the server when the repository owner has that permission. Gitea then pushed the repository's refs into an existing Git repository at that path with the permissions of the Gitea process.