Comparison Overview
Deutsche Telekom Stiftung

Deutsche Telekom Stiftung
Friedrich-Ebert-Allee 71-77, Bonn, 53113, DE
Last Update: 11/03/2026
Deutsche Telekom Stiftung was established in 2003 to strengthen Germany's position as an education, research and technology leader. It is one of the country's main corporate foundations with an endowment of EUR 150 million. The The mission of the Telekom-Stiftung is to ...

YMCA of the USA
101 N. Wacker Dr, Chicago, IL, US, 60606
Last Update: 04/04/2026
YMCA of the USA is the national resource office for the nation's YMCAs. Located in Chicago, IL, YMCA of the USA exists to serve YMCAs. To address the specific needs of communities, each YMCA is an independent organization, autonomous and separate from YMCA of the USA. T...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Deutsche Telekom Stiftung







YMCA of the USA






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Non-profit Organizations Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Deutsche Telekom Stiftung in 2026.
Incidents vs Non-profit Organizations Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for YMCA of the USA in 2026.
Incident History - Deutsche Telekom Stiftung (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Deutsche Telekom Stiftung cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - YMCA of the USA (X = Date, Y = Severity)
YMCA of the USA cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Deutsche Telekom Stiftung

YMCA of the USA
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.