Comparison Overview
Deutsche Telekom Design & Customer Experience

Deutsche Telekom Design & Customer Experience
Friedrich-Ebert-Allee 140, Bonn, North Rhine-Westphalia, DE, 53113
Last Update: 21/04/2026
The Deutsche Telekom Design & CX Team develops products, services, devices, apps, and interfaces based on customers’ needs and insights. We strive for the best customer experience to ease people’s life and to make technology human centered. To do so, we have built a sa...

Claro Brasil
Rua Henri Dunant, 780, São Paulo, 04709-110, BR
Last Update: 02/04/2026
Prazer, somos a Claro! Aqui, temos um grande time que faz tudo acontecer! É com o esforço e a dedicação de cada uma de nossas Pessoas que somos hoje referência no que fazemos, atuando unidos no nosso propósito, que é “Conectar para uma vida mais divertida e produtiva”....
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Deutsche Telekom Design & Customer Experience







Claro Brasil






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Deutsche Telekom Design & Customer Experience in 2026.
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Claro Brasil in 2026.
Incident History - Deutsche Telekom Design & Customer Experience (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Deutsche Telekom Design & Customer Experience cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Claro Brasil (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Claro Brasil cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Deutsche Telekom Design & Customer Experience

Claro Brasil
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.