Comparison Overview
Technology Transfer Office (TTO) – Erasmus MC

Technology Transfer Office (TTO) – Erasmus MC
Wytemaweg 80, Faculteitsgebouw, Rotterdam, Zuid Holland, NL, 3015 CN
Last Update: 30/12/2025
TTO assists Erasmus MC employees on elements related to intellectual property valorization, from diagnostics and therapeutics to medical devices and innovations in care, so it can reach the patients.

McKesson
6555 State Highway 161, Irving, 75039, US
Last Update: 07/10/2026
Welcome to the official LinkedIn page for McKesson Corporation. Our purpose is Advancing Health Outcomes for All®. Guided by a nearly 200-year legacy, we work with biopharma companies, providers, pharmacies, manufacturers, government entities and others to strengthen ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Technology Transfer Office (TTO) – Erasmus MC







McKesson






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Hospitals and Health Care Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Technology Transfer Office (TTO) – Erasmus MC in 2026.
Incidents vs Hospitals and Health Care Industry Avg (This Year)
McKesson has 98.02% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Technology Transfer Office (TTO) – Erasmus MC (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Technology Transfer Office (TTO) – Erasmus MC cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - McKesson (X = Date, Y = Severity)
McKesson cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Technology Transfer Office (TTO) – Erasmus MC

McKesson
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Requesting a user or organization profile page (`GET /{username}`) with an `Accept: application/rss+xml` or `Accept: application/atom+xml` header returned the owner's activity feed without the visibility check that the profile page and the `.rss` and `.atom` routes apply. Anonymous users, restricted users and non-members could confirm the existence of limited or private users and private organizations and read their profile details and public activity, also when `[other] ENABLE_FEED` was disabled. Activity in private repositories was not included.
The Gitea API endpoint for creating push mirrors (`POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/push_mirrors`) checked only whether mirroring was enabled and not the `[mirror] DISABLE_NEW_PUSH` setting that the web interface enforces. A repository administrator could therefore create new push mirrors on instances where the site administrator had disabled them. A push mirror pushes all refs of the repository to a remote chosen by the caller, on each commit or on a schedule.
The Gitea API endpoint `GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/media/{filepath}` wrote files of up to 1 KiB that are stored directly in Git, not in LFS, to the response without the content type and disposition headers Gitea uses for user content. An HTML file committed to a repository was therefore rendered by the browser on the Gitea origin. A user who can push to a repository could run JavaScript in the session of a victim who opens the media URL and act with the victim's permissions.
With `[repository] FORCE_PRIVATE = true`, Gitea creates new repositories as private, but the post-receive hook still applied the `repo.private=false` push option to an empty repository created by push. Any user who can create repositories could make their new repository public in violation of the instance policy. The default configuration is not affected.
The Gitea push mirror API checked whether the repository owner, instead of the requesting user, may use local file system paths. On instances with `[security] IMPORT_LOCAL_PATHS = true`, a repository administrator who is not allowed to import local paths could add a push mirror to a local path on the server when the repository owner has that permission. Gitea then pushed the repository's refs into an existing Git repository at that path with the permissions of the Gitea process.