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Comparison Overview

Teachers Pay TeachersTeachers Pay Teachers
VS
SwiggySwiggy
Teachers Pay Teachers

Teachers Pay Teachers

111 East 18th Street, 11th floor, New York, New York, US, 10003

Last Update: 01/04/2026

View Profile
786/1000Fair

TPT (formerly Teachers Pay Teachers) exists to empower teachers to teach at their best. We’re the go-to platform for supporting educators with the resources they need to teach successfully in an ever-changing education landscape. Today, educators turn to TPT to find the...

NAICS:513
NAICS Definition:Others
Employees:4,296
Subsidiaries:7
12-month incidents
0
Known data breaches
0
Attack type number
0
Swiggy

Swiggy

Bengaluru, Karnataka, IN

Last Update: 01/04/2026

View Profile
Between 750 and 799
https://careers.swiggy.com
790/1000Fair

Swiggy is India’s pioneering on-demand convenience platform, catering to millions of consumers each month. Founded in 2014, its mission is to elevate the quality of life for the urban consumer by offering unparalleled convenience. With an extensive footprint in food del...

NAICS:513
NAICS Definition:Others
Employees:26,451
Subsidiaries:2
12-month incidents
0
Known data breaches
0
Attack type number
0

Compliance Ranges Comparison

Based On Specific Ai Models Category
Teachers Pay Teachers

Teachers Pay Teachers

-
ISO 27001Not verified
ISO 27001
-
SOC2 Type 1Not verified
SOC2 Type 1
-
SOC2 Type 2Not verified
SOC2 Type 2
-
GDPRNot verified
GDPR
-
PCI DSSNot verified
PCI DSS
-
HIPAANot verified
HIPAA
Swiggy

Swiggy

-
ISO 27001Not verified
ISO 27001
-
SOC2 Type 1Not verified
SOC2 Type 1
-
SOC2 Type 2Not verified
SOC2 Type 2
-
GDPRNot verified
GDPR
-
PCI DSSNot verified
PCI DSS
-
HIPAANot verified
HIPAA

Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals

Incidents vs Technology, Information and Internet Industry Avg (This Year)

No incidents recorded for Teachers Pay Teachers in 2026.

Incidents

Incidents vs Technology, Information and Internet Industry Avg (This Year)

No incidents recorded for Swiggy in 2026.

Incidents

Incident History - Teachers Pay Teachers (X = Date, Y = Severity)

Teachers Pay Teachers cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.

R - Ransomware
C - Cyber Attack
D - Data Breach
V - Vulnerability

Incident History - Swiggy (X = Date, Y = Severity)

Swiggy cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.

No timeline data available
R - Ransomware
C - Cyber Attack
D - Data Breach
V - Vulnerability

Notable Incidents

Last Cyber / HR Incidents / Global...
Teachers Pay Teachers

Teachers Pay Teachers

Incidents
No explicit notable incidents reported.
Swiggy

Swiggy

Incidents
No explicit notable incidents reported.

FAQ

Between Teachers Pay Teachers company and Swiggy company, which one has the best AI Cybersecurity Score ?
Between Teachers Pay Teachers company and Swiggy company, which one has experienced more cyber incidents in the past ?
Between Teachers Pay Teachers company and Swiggy company, which one has experienced more cyber incidents this year ?
Between Teachers Pay Teachers company and Swiggy company, which one has experienced at least one ransomware attack ?
Between Teachers Pay Teachers company and Swiggy company, which one has experienced at least one data breach ?
Between Teachers Pay Teachers company and Swiggy company, which one has experienced at least one targeted cyberattack ?
Between Teachers Pay Teachers company and Swiggy company, which one has experienced at least one vulnerability ?
Between Teachers Pay Teachers company and Swiggy company, which one holds the most compliance certifications ?
Between Teachers Pay Teachers company and Swiggy company, which one holds the fewest compliance certifications ?
Between Teachers Pay Teachers company and Swiggy company, which one has the most subsidiaries ?
Between Teachers Pay Teachers company and Swiggy company, which one has the largest number of employees ?
Between Teachers Pay Teachers and Swiggy, which company holds both SOC 2 Type 1 certifications ?
Between Teachers Pay Teachers and Swiggy, which company holds both SOC 2 Type 2 certifications ?
Which company is ISO 27001 certified - Teachers Pay Teachers or Swiggy ?
Which company is PCI DSS compliant - Teachers Pay Teachers or Swiggy ?
Between Teachers Pay Teachers and Swiggy, which company complies with HIPAA regulations for healthcare data ?
Between Teachers Pay Teachers and Swiggy, which company complies with GDPR requirements ?

Latest Global CVEs

CVE-2026-55790
SUMMARY

Craft CMS is a content management system (CMS). In versions 5.0.0-RC1 through 5.9.22 and 4.0.0-RC1 through 4.17.15, an attacker with only a GitHub account can plant a JavaScript payload in a craftcms/cms issue title. When a Craft admin uses the CraftSupport widget’s "Give feedback" screen and types a search term that returns the poisoned issue, the payload executes in the admin’s control panel session. No control panel account or elevated privileges are required on the attacker’s side. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.17.16 and 5.9.23.

PUBLISHED
Date2026-07-01
UPDATED
Date2026-07-01
RISK INFORMATION (Score: )
CVSS4
Base Score: 7.4
Complexity: LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
IMPACT SCORE
NA
EXPLOITABILITY
NA
CVE-2026-50284
SUMMARY

Craft CMS is a content management system (CMS). In versions 5.0.0-RC1 through 5.9.21 and 4.0.0-RC1 through 4.17.14, theAssetsController::actionDeleteFolder() only requires the deleteAssets:<volume-uid> permission for the target folder. It never enforces deletePeerAssets:<volume-uid>, even though Assets::deleteFoldersByIds() cascades deletion to every descendant folder and every asset inside, regardless of the uploader's assigned privileges. A low-privilege user who has been granted folder-management rights on a shared volume can therefore destroy assets uploaded by other users (peer assets), bypassing the per-asset peer-permission check that the sibling actionDeleteAsset endpoint correctly applies. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.17.15 and 5.9.22.

PUBLISHED
Date2026-07-01
UPDATED
Date2026-07-01
RISK INFORMATION (Score: )
CVSS4
Base Score: 7.1
Complexity: LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
IMPACT SCORE
NA
EXPLOITABILITY
NA
CVE-2026-50283
SUMMARY

Craft CMS is a content management system (CMS). Versions 5.0.0-RC1 through 5.9.20, and 4.0.0-RC1 through 4.17.13 contain an authorization issue in the AssetsController::actionReplaceFile that can delete a source asset without source delete permission by supplying both assetId and sourceAssetId. AssetsController::actionReplaceFile() supports replacing a target asset file using another existing asset as the source. The action loads: assetId -> $assetToReplace and sourceAssetId -> $sourceAsset, then enforces replace permissions using ($assetToReplace ?: $sourceAsset). When both IDs are provided, this expression resolves to the target asset so no permission check is performed against the source asset volume. When both assets are present, Craft copies the source file into the target and then deletes the source asset. There is no deletion check for for the source asset. An authenticated user who can replace files in one volume can delete assets in another volume where they do not have delete permission, as long as they can obtain a sourceAssetId, leading to broken content references and data loss. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.17.14 and 5.9.21.

PUBLISHED
Date2026-07-01
UPDATED
Date2026-07-01
RISK INFORMATION (Score: )
CVSS4
Base Score: 5.3
Complexity: LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
IMPACT SCORE
NA
EXPLOITABILITY
NA
CVE-2026-14440
SUMMARY

Description: To issue and renew TLS certificates on behalf of customers, Cloudflare's Universal SSL feature automatically manages the CAA RRset for the customer's zone. This auto-managed RRset is permissive by design (e.g. 'issue "letsencrypt.org"' without parameters). On Universal SSL zones, Cloudflare's authoritative DNS serves this auto-managed RRset at query time, superseding any customer-configured CAA records on the zone. When a customer publishes a stricter CAA record using the RFC 8657 accounturi or validationmethods parameters, the Certificate Authority does not observe those parameters when evaluating the served RRset under RFC 8659. As a result, the RFC 8657 account-binding and validation-method-binding protections are not enforced end-to-end on Universal SSL zones. Successful exploitation could result in issuance of a browser-trusted TLS certificate to an attacker, enabling MITM against the affected domain. Exploitation is non-trivial in practice: an attacker would need to hold an ACME account at one of the Certificate Authorities in the served CAA RRset and to simultaneously satisfy domain control validation across the multiple geographically distinct Network Perspectives the CA relies on for Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration. Cloudflare prefixes are anycast-announced from hundreds of locations globally, raising the bar against single-vantage-point BGP hijacks. Any resulting misissuance of a browser-trusted certificate is subject to Certificate Transparency logging required by major browsers, and would be visible to CT monitoring. Mitigation:  Customers requiring strict RFC 8657 enforcement need to disable Universal SSL on the affected zone. Universal SSL's automatic CAA management and customer-set RFC 8657 accounturi and validationmethods enforcement are mutually exclusive by the nature of the issue, so there is no in-product workaround that preserves both.  Certificate Transparency monitoring is recommended for all customers as a general detection control. Credits: David Osipov (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0005-2713-9242), independent researcher

PUBLISHED
Date2026-07-01
UPDATED
Date2026-07-01
RISK INFORMATION (Score: )
CVSS4
Base Score: 7.6
Complexity: HIGH
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
IMPACT SCORE
NA
EXPLOITABILITY
NA
CVE-2026-14422
SUMMARY

Out of bounds read and write in Tint in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.46 allowed a remote attacker to potentially perform out of bounds memory access via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)

PUBLISHED
Date2026-07-01
UPDATED
Date2026-07-01
IMPACT SCORE
NA
EXPLOITABILITY
NA