Comparison Overview
TDK-Lambda Americas

TDK-Lambda Americas
405 Essex Rd, Neptune , 07753, US
Last Update: 04/03/2026
TDK-Lambda Corporation, a group company of TDK Corporation, is a recognized leader and global supplier of power conversion products for industrial and medical equipment worldwide. TDK-Lambda Corporation can quickly meet any customer need with R&D, manufacturing, sales a...

Eaton
30 Pembroke Road, Dublin, Ireland, IE, 4
Last Update: 12/09/2026
Eaton is an intelligent power management company dedicated to improving the quality of life and protecting the environment for people everywhere. We are guided by our commitment to do business right, to operate sustainably and to help our customers manage power ─ today ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

TDK-Lambda Americas







Eaton






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Appliances, Electrical, and Electronics Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for TDK-Lambda Americas in 2026.
Incidents vs Appliances, Electrical, and Electronics Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Eaton in 2026.
Incident History - TDK-Lambda Americas (X = Date, Y = Severity)
TDK-Lambda Americas cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Eaton (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Eaton cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

TDK-Lambda Americas

Eaton
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.