Comparison Overview
Tata Elxsi Japan

Tata Elxsi Japan
堀川町580, 川崎市, 212-0013, JP
Last Update: 10/03/2026
タタ・エレクシー・リミテッドは、自動車、放送、通信、ヘルスケアなどの業界に向けて設計および技術サービスを提供する会社です。当社は、IoT (モノのインターネット)、クラウド、モビリティ、仮想現実、人工知能などのデジタル技術のデザイン思考とその応用によりお客様の製品とサービスを新たに具現化しています。まさに 無限の可能性を秘めた場所であると言っても過言ではありません。私たちは、誰にでもチャンスがあると信じています。大胆に、好奇心旺盛に、未来を形作ることを目指しています。可能性を探り、好きなことを発見し、成長への加速する道をどうぞ見つけて...

Hexaware Technologies
#1, Sector III, Millennium Business Park,, 'A' Block , TTC Industrial Estate, Mahape,, Navi Mumbai, Maharashtra, IN, 400710
Last Update: 17/08/2026
At Hexaware, we're not just a global technology and business process services company; we're a community of 31,600+ Hexawarians dedicated to one singular purpose: creating smiles through the power of great people and technology. With a presence in 58 offices across 28 c...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Tata Elxsi Japan







Hexaware Technologies






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Tata Elxsi Japan in 2026.
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
Hexaware Technologies has 2.91% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Tata Elxsi Japan (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Tata Elxsi Japan cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Hexaware Technologies (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Hexaware Technologies cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Tata Elxsi Japan

Hexaware Technologies
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.