Comparison Overview
Target Engineering Construction Co LLC

Target Engineering Construction Co LLC
Al Mu-Atamarat Street, Abu Dhabi, Abu Dhabi, 960, AE
Last Update: 12/12/2025
Target Engineering Construction Company was established in 1975 and operates through its specialized divisions – Power, Oil and Gas Division and Civil & Marine Division. Target Engineering Construction Company offers a single source EPC service with standalone specialt...

Hassan Allam Holding
Yehia Zakaria Street, Industrial-Lot 5, Sheraton Helioplis Housing., Cairo, EG
Last Update: 02/04/2026
Hassan Allam Holding is a leading group with a focus on engineering and construction, and investment and development. The Group operates in diverse sectors including infrastructure, energy, water, industrial, logistics, petrochemical, and complex large-scale projects in...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Target Engineering Construction Co LLC







Hassan Allam Holding






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Target Engineering Construction Co LLC in 2026.
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Hassan Allam Holding in 2026.
Incident History - Target Engineering Construction Co LLC (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Target Engineering Construction Co LLC cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Hassan Allam Holding (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Hassan Allam Holding cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Target Engineering Construction Co LLC

Hassan Allam Holding
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
The CONS_HISTORY ioctl handler did not adequately validate the requested history size. A large value caused an integer overflow in the buffer size calculation, resulting in a heap allocation smaller than expected. Subsequent initialization of the buffer wrote beyond the end of the allocation. An unprivileged local user with access to a vt(4) device can trigger an out-of-bounds write in the kernel, potentially escalating privileges.
The ELF image activator cleared per-process ASLR preference flags for setuid binaries after the code that computes the PIE base address, rather than before. As a result, a user-requested ASLR disable was still in effect at the point where the base address was chosen. An unprivileged local user can disable ASLR for a setuid PIE binary by calling procctl(2) before execve(2). This makes exploitation of any separate memory corruption vulnerability in that binary significantly easier.
Second, the audio buffer backing a mapping could be freed when the device was closed even though the mapping remained valid. The freed memory could then be reused elsewhere while still accessible through the stale mapping. The /dev/dsp device nodes are world-accessible by default. On a system with an audio device, either issue allows an unprivileged local user to read and write kernel memory, which can be used to escalate privileges, potentially gaining full control of the affected system. At a minimum, an attacker can crash the kernel, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).
The Linuxulator determined whether a binary was set-user-ID or set-group-ID by checking the P_SUGID process flag. During execve(2), this flag is not yet set at the point where the auxiliary vector is constructed, so AT_SECURE was incorrectly set to zero for set-user-ID and set-group-ID executables. An unprivileged local user can inject a shared library via LD_PRELOAD into a set-user-ID or set-group-ID Linux binary, gaining the privileges of that binary.
The kernel handler for IPV6_MSFILTER dropped a serializing lock in order to copy the source-filter list from userspace, then reacquired the lock. During this window another thread could free the multicast filter structure, leaving the handler with a stale pointer to freed memory. An unprivileged local user can exploit this use-after-free to escalate privileges.