Comparison Overview
Talent Solutions Singapore

Talent Solutions Singapore
1 Wallich Street, Singapore, Singapore, 078881, SG
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Talent Solutions combines our leading global offerings RPO, TAPFIN-MSP and Right Management to provide end-to-end, data-driven capabilities across the talent lifecycle. Leveraging our deep industry expertise and understanding of what talent wants, we help organizations ...

Michael Page
PageGroup, Addlestone, Weybridge, GB, KT15 2QW
Last Update: 06/09/2026
Welcome to the Michael Page global company profile. Michael Page has five decades of expertise in professional services recruitment. We were established in London in 1976, and over this period we've grown organically to become one of the best-known and most respected c...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Talent Solutions Singapore







Michael Page






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Staffing and Recruiting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Talent Solutions Singapore in 2026.
Incidents vs Staffing and Recruiting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Michael Page in 2026.
Incident History - Talent Solutions Singapore (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Talent Solutions Singapore cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Michael Page (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Michael Page cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Talent Solutions Singapore

Michael Page
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Requesting a user or organization profile page (`GET /{username}`) with an `Accept: application/rss+xml` or `Accept: application/atom+xml` header returned the owner's activity feed without the visibility check that the profile page and the `.rss` and `.atom` routes apply. Anonymous users, restricted users and non-members could confirm the existence of limited or private users and private organizations and read their profile details and public activity, also when `[other] ENABLE_FEED` was disabled. Activity in private repositories was not included.
The Gitea API endpoint for creating push mirrors (`POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/push_mirrors`) checked only whether mirroring was enabled and not the `[mirror] DISABLE_NEW_PUSH` setting that the web interface enforces. A repository administrator could therefore create new push mirrors on instances where the site administrator had disabled them. A push mirror pushes all refs of the repository to a remote chosen by the caller, on each commit or on a schedule.
The Gitea API endpoint `GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/media/{filepath}` wrote files of up to 1 KiB that are stored directly in Git, not in LFS, to the response without the content type and disposition headers Gitea uses for user content. An HTML file committed to a repository was therefore rendered by the browser on the Gitea origin. A user who can push to a repository could run JavaScript in the session of a victim who opens the media URL and act with the victim's permissions.
With `[repository] FORCE_PRIVATE = true`, Gitea creates new repositories as private, but the post-receive hook still applied the `repo.private=false` push option to an empty repository created by push. Any user who can create repositories could make their new repository public in violation of the instance policy. The default configuration is not affected.
The Gitea push mirror API checked whether the repository owner, instead of the requesting user, may use local file system paths. On instances with `[security] IMPORT_LOCAL_PATHS = true`, a repository administrator who is not allowed to import local paths could add a push mirror to a local path on the server when the repository owner has that permission. Gitea then pushed the repository's refs into an existing Git repository at that path with the permissions of the Gitea process.