Comparison Overview
T-Mobile Czech Republic a.s.

T-Mobile Czech Republic a.s.
Tomíčkova 2144/1, Praha 4, CZ, 148 00
Last Update: 06/03/2026
T-Mobile Czech Republic, člen mezinárodní telekomunikační skupiny Deutsche Telekom, je téměř se 6,5 milionu mobilních zákazníků jedničkou na českém trhu. Jsme dokonale integrovaným mobilním operátorem a kromě telekomunikačních služeb nabízíme také komplexní ICT řešení p...

T-Mobile
12920 SE 38th St, Bellevue, WA, US, 98006
Last Update: 03/07/2026
As the supercharged Un-carrier, T-Mobile US, Inc. (NASDAQ: TMUS) is powered by an award-winning 5G network that connects more people, in more places, than ever before. With T-Mobile’s unique value proposition of best network, best value, and best experiences, the Un-car...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

T-Mobile Czech Republic a.s.







T-Mobile






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for T-Mobile Czech Republic a.s. in 2026.
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
T-Mobile has 188.46% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - T-Mobile Czech Republic a.s. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
T-Mobile Czech Republic a.s. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - T-Mobile (X = Date, Y = Severity)
T-Mobile cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

T-Mobile Czech Republic a.s.

T-Mobile
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
goshs is a feature-rich single-binary file server for red teamers and developers. Prior to 2.1.5, the httpserver/handler.go sendFile handler opened files using a cleaned path but derived the authorization filename from raw req.URL.Path, so a trailing slash could bypass .goshs ACL-file protection and block-list checks. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.5.
goshs is a feature-rich single-binary file server for red teamers and developers. Prior to 2.1.5, the httpserver/updown.go multipart upload handler split part.FileName() on / but did not reject .., allowing an unauthenticated upload with filename .. to create a file outside the served tree. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.5.
goshs is a feature-rich single-binary file server for red teamers and developers. Prior to 2.1.4, the httpserver/server.go wdGuard handled WebDAV MOVE as a write-only method and did not enforce --no-delete, allowing WebDAV clients to delete or overwrite files via MOVE with Overwrite: T. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.4.
goshs is a feature-rich single-binary file server for red teamers and developers. From 2.1.3 until 2.1.4, the sftpserver/sftpserver.go password handler used Username != "" && Password != "", so running goshs with -b 'admin:' -sftp and no -fkf left both SFTP authentication handlers unset and allowed unauthenticated file access. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.4.
Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, HttpPostRequestEncoder constructs multipart HTTP request bodies by directly concatenating user-supplied filenames and field names into Content-Disposition MIME headers without validating or sanitizing CRLF characters (\r\n). Since MIME headers are delimited by CRLF, an attacker who controls the filename can inject arbitrary MIME headers into the multipart body part. The root cause is that neither the encoder nor the FileUpload implementations' setFilename() methods, which only check for null, neutralize CRLF characters before the filename is embedded into the header. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final.