Comparison Overview
Syngenta Vector Control

Syngenta Vector Control
Basel, CH
Last Update: 14/03/2026
Welcome to Syngent Vector Control. We believe that people around the world deserve to live their lives uninterrupted by mosquito-borne diseases such as malaria. Syngenta Vector Control delivers on this commitment by playing a leading role in the prevention of vector-bor...

Clean Harbors
42 Longwater Drive, Norwell, 02061-9149, US
Last Update: 13/09/2026
Clean Harbors is North America’s leading provider of environmental and industrial services. The Company serves a diverse customer base, including a majority of Fortune 500 companies. Its customer base spans a number of industries, including chemical, and manufacturing, ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Syngenta Vector Control







Clean Harbors






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Environmental Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Syngenta Vector Control in 2026.
Incidents vs Environmental Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Clean Harbors in 2026.
Incident History - Syngenta Vector Control (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Syngenta Vector Control cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Clean Harbors (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Clean Harbors cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Syngenta Vector Control

Clean Harbors
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.