Comparison Overview
Sumitomo Electric Lightwave

Sumitomo Electric Lightwave
201 South Rogers Lane, Suite 100, Raleigh, NC, US, 27610
Last Update: 08/02/2026
Sumitomo Electric Lightwave (SEL) creates advanced optical fiber solutions for the future of communication networks. We are at the forefront of the connected world - always innovating and empowering our customers through technology. Our fiber optic products, services, a...

Vodafone
1 Kingdom Street, London, W2 6BY, GB
Last Update: 08/09/2026
At Vodafone, our purpose is to connect everyone. From the seabed to the stars, we provide innovative mobile and fixed connectivity solutions to empower our customers across the globe. And we're constantly expanding coverage to bridge continents and spread inclusion, eve...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Sumitomo Electric Lightwave







Vodafone






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Sumitomo Electric Lightwave in 2026.
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
Vodafone has 96.08% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Sumitomo Electric Lightwave (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Sumitomo Electric Lightwave cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Vodafone (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Vodafone cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Sumitomo Electric Lightwave

Vodafone
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.