Comparison Overview
Sumitomo Electric Carbide

Sumitomo Electric Carbide
1001 E Business Center Drive, None, Mount Prospect, Illinois, US, 60056
Last Update: 01/12/2025
For 40 years in the United States, we've made it our mission to design and produce exceptionally innovative and advanced cutting tool solutions. Our aggressive R&D and design ingenuity give you more choices in turning systems, drilling systems, milling systems and inser...

Thermax Limited
IN, IN
Last Update: 23/09/2026
Incorporated in 1966, Thermax Group is a 1 billion US$ company headquartered in Pune, India. Over the years, it has grown into a leading conglomerate in the energy and environment space and a trusted partner in energy transition. Strategically spreading its operations ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Sumitomo Electric Carbide







Thermax Limited






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Industrial Machinery Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Sumitomo Electric Carbide in 2026.
Incidents vs Industrial Machinery Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Thermax Limited in 2026.
Incident History - Sumitomo Electric Carbide (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Sumitomo Electric Carbide cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Thermax Limited (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Thermax Limited cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Sumitomo Electric Carbide

Thermax Limited
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.