Comparison Overview
Straumann Group

Straumann Group
Peter Merian-Weg 12, Basel, Basel-Town, 4052, CH
Last Update: 19/02/2026
United for global excellence in dentistry. Every vision has its story, and ours began more than 60 years ago. Since then, our innovations and achievements have become landmarks in dentistry worldwide. Straumann began as a family-owned institute, grew into a publicly-own...

Boston Scientific
100 Boston Scientific Way, Marlborough, 01752, US
Last Update: 09/09/2026
Boston Scientific transforms lives through innovative medical technologies that improve the health of patients around the world. As a global medical technology leader for more than 40 years, we advance science for life by providing a broad range of high-performance solu...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Straumann Group







Boston Scientific






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Medical Equipment Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Straumann Group in 2026.
Incidents vs Medical Equipment Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
Boston Scientific has 191.26% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Straumann Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Straumann Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Boston Scientific (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Boston Scientific cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Straumann Group

Boston Scientific
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.