Comparison Overview
Storm Reply, Inc.

Storm Reply, Inc.
71 S Wacker Dr, Chicago, 60606, US
Last Update: 20/12/2025
Storm Reply is a global AWS Premier Partner trusted by industry leaders in Financial Services, Healthcare, Automotive, Manufacturing, Energy, Telecom, Retail, the Public Sector, and Professional Services worldwide. In the US and beyond, our experts tackle your toughest...

EY
6 More London Place, London, SE1 2DA, GB
Last Update: 29/07/2026
EY is building a better working world by creating new value for clients, people, society, the planet, while building trust in the capital markets. Enabled by data, AI and advanced technology, EY teams help clients shape the future with confidence and develop answers fo...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Storm Reply, Inc.







EY






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Professional Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Storm Reply, Inc. in 2026.
Incidents vs Professional Services Industry Avg (This Year)
EY has 191.26% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Storm Reply, Inc. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Storm Reply, Inc. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - EY (X = Date, Y = Severity)
EY cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Storm Reply, Inc.

EY
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
In OpenStack Designate before 22.0.2, the mDNS handler performs pool-blind lookups when resolving record queries and NOTIFY requests. When two zones with the same name exist across different pools, the lookup fails with a deterministic error, causing the handler to return REFUSED for all DNS queries through that path. The _handle_notify path is exploitable via a single unauthenticated UDP packet. This is independently reachable through the cross-tenant zone overlap described in a different recent CVE, and also affects legitimate same-tenant cross-pool configurations. BIND9 views do not mitigate this issue as mDNS is a shared service upstream of any view configuration.
In OpenStack Designate before 22.0.1, zone creation checks (_is_subzone, _is_superzone, and the duplicate-zone DB constraint) are scoped to the target pool only. An authenticated user can bypass these checks by scheduling a zone to a different pool via the AttributeFilter scheduler, creating an overlapping zone that conflicts with another tenant's zone. This enables cross-tenant DNS hijack (redirecting traffic to attacker-controlled IPs) and DNS denial of service (NODATA responses). Exploitation requires a multi-pool deployment with AttributeFilter enabled in scheduler_filters, which is a non-default but documented and supported configuration for self-service tiering.
UpSnap is a wake on lan web app. Versions prior to 5.4.0 have an OS command injection vulnerability in the UpSnap’s device management functionality due to the presence of unsafe shell command template interpolation using the ip and the mac fields. User-controlled values can be inserted into the wake_cmd and shutdown_cmd templates and executed via /bin/sh -c (Linux) or cmd /C (Windows) without sanitization, resulting in an authenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE). A low-privileged user with permission to create or edit devices can execute arbitrary operating system commands on the UpSnap hosted server. Version 5.4.0 patches the issue.
FUXA is a web-based Process Visualization (SCADA/HMI/Dashboard) software. When `secureEnabled=true`, FUXA `1.3.0-2773` still allows guest and invalid-token requests to read project, alarms, and scheduler APIs. Version 1.3.1 fixes this issue.
FUXA is a web-based Process Visualization (SCADA/HMI/Dashboard) software. In fuxa-server version 1.3.0, the GET /api/project endpoint exposes sensitive project configuration data to guest-context requests even when secureEnabled is enabled. Version 1.3.1 fixes the issue.