Comparison Overview
Stop & Shop

Stop & Shop
1385 Hancock St, Quincy, MA, US
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Stop & Shop has been around for more than 100 years. We started small, as a corner grocery store back in 1914. And we’ve grown…a lot. We have more than 50,000 Associates in 350+ stores throughout Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, and New Jersey. Throug...

MAP Group Asia
Sahid Sudirman Center, Jakarta, 10220, ID
Last Update: 06/09/2026
MAP Group Asia is Indonesia’s leading retail organization with an expanding presence across Southeast Asia. Our diverse portfolio includes Sports, Fashion, Digital, Department Stores, Kids, Food & Beverage, and Lifestyle. As a market leader, we are committed to buildin...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Stop & Shop







MAP Group Asia






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Stop & Shop in 2026.
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for MAP Group Asia in 2026.
Incident History - Stop & Shop (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Stop & Shop cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - MAP Group Asia (X = Date, Y = Severity)
MAP Group Asia cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Stop & Shop

MAP Group Asia
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.