Comparison Overview
Stirling Dynamics
Stirling Dynamics
230 Bristol Business Park, Bristol, England, BS16 1EJ, GB
Last Update: 07/01/2026
Stirling Dynamics is an advanced engineering company located in the UK and Germany that provides high-end engineering products and services. Our strength is not only in providing world-leading technical expertise but also in our ability to work collaboratively with cust...
NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration
300 E Street SW, Washington, 20546, US
Last Update: 03/04/2026
For more than 60 years, NASA has been breaking barriers to achieve the seemingly impossible—from walking on the Moon to pushing the boundaries of human spaceflight farther than ever before. We work in space and around the world in laboratories and wind tunnels, on airfi...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
Stirling Dynamics
NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Aviation and Aerospace Component Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Stirling Dynamics in 2026.
Incidents vs Aviation and Aerospace Component Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration in 2026.
Incident History - Stirling Dynamics (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Stirling Dynamics cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration (X = Date, Y = Severity)
NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
Stirling Dynamics
NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.