Comparison Overview
Stefanini Brasil

Stefanini Brasil
Avenida Eusébio Matoso 1375, São Paulo, 05423-905, BR
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Global Tech Consulting Company All in One. Stefanini is a Brazilian multinational company with 37 years of experience and presence in 41 countries. With more than 38,000 employees, we co-create solutions for a better future, driving digital transformation with a focu...

Slalom
821 2nd Ave., Suite 1900, Seattle, WA, US, 98104
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Slalom is a fiercely human business and technology consulting company that leads with outcomes to bring more value, in all ways, always. We team with leaders who expect more. So we bring more. From strategy through delivery, our agile teams across 53 offices in 12 coun...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Stefanini Brasil







Slalom






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Business Consulting and Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Stefanini Brasil in 2026.
Incidents vs Business Consulting and Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Slalom in 2026.
Incident History - Stefanini Brasil (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Stefanini Brasil cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Slalom (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Slalom cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Stefanini Brasil

Slalom
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.