Comparison Overview
Starbucks China

Starbucks China
徐汇区桂箐路65号, 上海市, 上海市, CN, 200233
Last Update: 22/03/2026
星巴克咖啡公司自1999年进入中国以来,秉承“激发并孕育人文精神——每人、每杯、每个社区”的公司使命,我们始终致力于在中国成为一家与众不同的公司:在传承经典咖啡文化的同时,关爱我们的伙伴,为顾客提供超越期望的星巴克体验,并为所在社区的繁荣做出自己的贡献。目前星巴克已经在中国大陆130多个城市开设了3,000多家门店,拥有40,000名身穿绿围裙的星巴克伙伴。 我们热爱我们的咖啡。星巴克始终致力于通过道德采购,烘焙并提供高品质的阿拉比卡咖啡豆。我们还在中国云南普洱建立了星巴克中国咖啡种植者支持中心,旨在整合...

Grupo Dia
Parque Empresarial Las Rozas, Edif. Tripark C/ Jacinto Benavente, 2 A, Las Rozas, Madrid, ES, 28232
Last Update: 28/03/2026
With more than 40 years history, Grupo DIA is a Spanish multinational in the food, drugstore, beauty and health distribution sector. DIA arrived with the commitment to respond to the needs of all families, offering quality at the best price through a wide network of lo...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Starbucks China







Grupo Dia






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Starbucks China in 2026.
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Grupo Dia in 2026.
Incident History - Starbucks China (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Starbucks China cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Grupo Dia (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Grupo Dia cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Starbucks China

Grupo Dia
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Cline is an autonomous coding agent as an SDK, IDE extension, or CLI assistant. Prior to 3.0.30, the Cline Hub dashboard server launched by the cline dashboard command accepts WebSocket connections on the /browser endpoint without validating the Origin header, and when ROOM_SECRET is unset for local 127.0.0.1 binds, isAuthorizedBrowserRequest() allows attacker-controlled websites to send desktopCommand frames that read workspace state, mutate MCP and provider settings, and trigger command execution when a provider or model is configured. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.30.
CoreWCF is a port of the service side of Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) to .NET Core. In version 1.9.0, CoreWCF SPNEGO SecurityContextToken negotiation can expose the proof key recovered from the RSTR when TransportWithMessageCredential with Windows client credentials and session establishment are used, allowing an observer to impersonate the authenticated Windows principal and decrypt or forge WS-SecureConversation traffic. This issue is fixed in version 1.9.1.
CoreWCF is a port of the service side of Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) to .NET Core. Prior to 1.8.1 and 1.9.1, CoreWCF WS-Security endorsing and supporting signature verification does not ensure the selected ds:Signature covers the expected Security header target, allowing an attacker with one captured signed SOAP envelope to replay arbitrary service operations as the victim principal. This issue is fixed in versions 1.8.1 and 1.9.1.
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/0589692d4b9a41d21b34ac48281e95f6df7f4ce5
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/30aef805270976c42477e3f2a05f4e563d86e247
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/4618f24165ad018ad3ed2636bf8c3bc87d2a3be2
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.8.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.9.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/security/advisories/GHSA-gqv6-pwcg-87r8
CoreWCF is a port of the service side of Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) to .NET Core. Prior to 1.8.1 and 1.9.1, CoreWCF SAML 1.1 and SAML 2.0 token validation does not correctly resolve the issuer signing key or require signed tokens when IdentityConfiguration is used with federated bindings, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to impersonate any principal the trusted STS could issue. This issue is fixed in versions 1.8.1 and 1.9.1.
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/0b8c8af851260e85e8402af53233d1b8f87dfb6f
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/0e63c2cca55763d8be6b226a234579280a09e7b6
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/e5cc9b6a4ecc102a50d782093bfc72e0790abe3d
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.8.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.9.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/security/advisories/GHSA-xjr9-gg9q-jx3v
CoreWCF is a port of the service side of Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) to .NET Core. Prior to 1.8.1 and 1.9.1, CoreWCF SAML token validation does not enforce SubjectConfirmation method URIs or holder-of-key proof keys in SamlSecurityTokenHandler, allowing holder-of-key downgrade or custom confirmation method assertions to authenticate a subject without proving authority over the assertion. This issue is fixed in versions 1.8.1 and 1.9.1.
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/6a99df3242f54acd6f89edfd6050430b72d0c685
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/86dd3232b6b8aaf32281be9e8d798afad6145d58
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/9eb9b46d1c2af06fb71f656a02f4d5b4649c1f03
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.8.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.9.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/security/advisories/GHSA-48pq-2xq3-c2m4