Comparison Overview
STANLEY Access Technologies
STANLEY Access Technologies
N/A
Last Update: 06/03/2026
When it comes to automatic door openings, STANLEY is setting the standard for tough, dependable, long-lasting performance. Since we invented the first swing door operator in 1932, we’ve grown into the largest manufacturer, installer and service provider of automatic doo...
Masco Corporation
17450 College Parkway, Livonia, 48152, US
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Masco Corporation is a global leader in the design, manufacture and distribution of branded home improvement and building products. Our products enhance the way consumers all over the world experience and enjoy their living spaces. Our portfolio of industry-leading bran...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
STANLEY Access Technologies
Masco Corporation
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Wholesale Building Materials Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for STANLEY Access Technologies in 2026.
Incidents vs Wholesale Building Materials Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Masco Corporation in 2026.
Incident History - STANLEY Access Technologies (X = Date, Y = Severity)
STANLEY Access Technologies cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Masco Corporation (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Masco Corporation cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
STANLEY Access Technologies
Masco Corporation
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A security vulnerability has been detected in adafap api-mcp up to 92b9a5d04acfec165c7d4ef852496593aa87be06. This affects the function customAxios of the file app/api/proxy/route.ts of the component Proxy API Endpoint. The manipulation of the argument url leads to server-side request forgery. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. This product adopts a rolling release strategy to maintain continuous delivery. Therefore, version details for affected or updated releases cannot be specified. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
A weakness has been identified in PhialsBasement KoboldCPP-MCP-Server 1.0.0. Affected by this issue is the function makeRequest of the file src/index.ts of the component BaseConfigSchema. Executing a manipulation of the argument apiUrl can lead to server-side request forgery. It is possible to launch the attack on the local host. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
A security flaw has been discovered in Handwriting-OCR handwriting-ocr-mcp-server 0.1.0. Affected by this vulnerability is the function fs.readFileSync of the file src/index.ts of the component upload_document. Performing a manipulation of the argument File results in path traversal. Attacking locally is a requirement. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
A vulnerability was identified in Nikolaibibo claude-comfyui-mcp 1.0.0. Affected is the function copyFileSync of the file src/tools/utils.ts of the component comfy_upload_image. Such manipulation of the argument image_path leads to path traversal. An attack has to be approached locally. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in nltk/nltk versions 3.9.4 and the current develop branch. The `nltk.pathsec.validate_network_url()` function, intended to prevent SSRF by rejecting internal network addresses, fails to reject IPs in the RFC 6598 shared address space (`100.64.0.0/10`). This occurs because Python's `ipaddress` module does not classify such addresses as `is_private` or `is_global`, and the current guard only checks `is_private` and a few explicit categories. An attacker who can influence a URL passed to NLTK's network-loading helpers can exploit this vulnerability to make a strict-mode application send requests to shared-address-space hosts, potentially exposing non-public infrastructure reachable from the application host. The impact is limited to SSRF-style confidentiality exposure, with no code execution claimed.