Comparison Overview
Standard Bank Malawi
Standard Bank Malawi
Standard Bank Centre, African Unity Avenue, Lilongwe, MW
Last Update: 22/02/2026
Standard Bank in Malawi previously operated as the Commercial Bank of Malawi, which was registered as a commercial bank on 15 March 1969. Our first branch was opened in Limbe on 11 April 1970.
CIC
6, Avenue de Provence, Paris, Île-de-France, FR, 75009
Last Update: 01/04/2026
CIC is the fourth largest banking group in France, consisting of seven regional banks which operate across France through a network of 1,844 branches employing 24,000 staff. CIC's customer base includes 2.7 million retail clients. One in eleven self-employed professiona...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
Standard Bank Malawi
CIC
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Banking Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Standard Bank Malawi in 2026.
Incidents vs Banking Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for CIC in 2026.
Incident History - Standard Bank Malawi (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Standard Bank Malawi cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - CIC (X = Date, Y = Severity)
CIC cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
Standard Bank Malawi
CIC
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
IBM TRIRIGA Application Platform 5.0.0 through 5.0.8 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to exposure of session tokens in the HTML response.
IBM TRIRIGA Application Platform 5.0.0 through 5.0.8 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to an XML external entity (XXE) injection flaw.
IBM Aspera Enterprise WebApps 1.0.0 through 1.0.6 could allow a local attacker to obtain sensitive information due to cleartext transmission of sensitive information.
IBM Planning Analytics 2.0, and 2.1 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code due to a stack-based buffer overflow.
IBM DataStage on Cloud Pak for Data 5.4.0.0 can allow a man-in-the-middle attacker to present a forged TLS certificate, intercept the connection, and capture the IAM bearer Authorization header automatically attached by the session adapter. The captured token grants full platform-scope tenant API access, enabling the attacker to read and manipulate the victim's DataStage projects, flows, assets, and pipeline definitions. This is client-side SDK code running on the user's own machine, so exploitation requires an external network interceptor rather than a co-tenant in the shared cluster.