Comparison Overview
Stage Entertainment

Stage Entertainment
De Boelelaan 30, Amsterdam, Noord-Holland, undefined, NL
Last Update: 19/02/2026
Stage Entertainment is a leading global producer and theatre operator focused on producing musicals in Europe and attracting seven million people to its musicals each year. The company owns and operates sixteen significant venues in its home markets of the Netherlands, ...

Dave & Buster's Inc.
1221 S Belt Line Rd, Coppell, Texas, 75019, US
Last Update: 05/09/2026
Welcome to Dave & Buster's, the ONLY place to Eat, Drink, Play & Watch Sports®, all under one roof! Here, you can immerse yourself in a world of excitement, from our Million Dollar Midway, packed with the hottest arcade games, to our mouth-watering, chef-crafted creatio...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Stage Entertainment







Dave & Buster's Inc.






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Entertainment Providers Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Stage Entertainment in 2026.
Incidents vs Entertainment Providers Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Dave & Buster's Inc. in 2026.
Incident History - Stage Entertainment (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Stage Entertainment cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Dave & Buster's Inc. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Dave & Buster's Inc. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Stage Entertainment

Dave & Buster's Inc.
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.