Comparison Overview
St.George Bank

St.George Bank
200 Barangaroo Avenue, Sydney, NSW, 2000, AU
Last Update: 02/04/2026
St.George Bank is one of Australia's leading Retail and Business Banks, serving over 2.6 million consumer, business and corporate customers in Australia. With more than 5700 staff and 396 St.George and BankSA retail branches, St.George is known for exceptional service,...

Rabobank
Croeselaan 18, Utrecht, 3521CB, NL
Last Update: 29/03/2026
Rabobank is a cooperative bank with a mission. Our goal: to help customers realize their ambitions. We serve about 10 million customers in 47 countries. As an international financial institution, we work on the well-being and prosperity of millions of people. In the Net...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

St.George Bank







Rabobank






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Banking Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for St.George Bank in 2026.
Incidents vs Banking Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Rabobank in 2026.
Incident History - St.George Bank (X = Date, Y = Severity)
St.George Bank cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Rabobank (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Rabobank cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

St.George Bank

Rabobank
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains a path traversal vulnerability in MultiAgentMonitor that fails to sanitize agent IDs when building file paths. Attackers can include traversal sequences like ../ in agent IDs to read, write, or overwrite arbitrary files, enabling sensitive disclosure, denial of service, or code execution.
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MultiAgentLedger component that allows attackers to access sensitive data by registering agents with duplicate IDs. Attackers can exploit the lack of agent ID uniqueness enforcement to share ledger instances and expose system prompts and conversation history between agents.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 contains a cross-origin agent execution vulnerability in the AGUI endpoint that allows remote attackers to trigger arbitrary agent execution. The POST /agui endpoint lacks authentication and hardcodes Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * headers, combined with Starlette's Content-Type-agnostic JSON parsing, enabling attackers to bypass CORS preflight checks via simple requests and exfiltrate sensitive agent responses including tool execution results and environment data.
PraisonAI before 4.5.128 contains an arbitrary shell command execution vulnerability where the UI modules hardcode approval_mode to auto, overriding administrator configuration from PRAISON_APPROVAL_MODE environment variable. Authenticated attackers can instruct the LLM agent to execute arbitrary shell commands via subprocess.run with shell=True, bypassing the manual approval gate and insufficient command sanitization blocklists.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 caches tool approval decisions by tool name only, not by invocation arguments, allowing subsequent execute_command calls to bypass approval prompts. Attackers can exploit this by obtaining initial approval for a benign command, then silently exfiltrate API keys and credentials via subsequent shell commands without user consent.