Comparison Overview
ST Engineering North America
ST Engineering North America
2011 Crystal Dr, Arlington, Virginia, US, 22202
Last Update: 31/12/2025
ST Engineering is a global technology, defense and engineering group with a diverse portfolio of businesses across the aerospace, smart city, defense and public security segments. In the U.S., we operate in over 50 cities across 21 states with our headquarters in Arlin...
Lockheed Martin
6801 Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, 20817, US
Last Update: 20/05/2026
The world relies on what we do. Headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland, with offices across the U.S. and around the globe, our team delivers solutions that strengthen national security, shape industries and push engineering and technology to new levels. We collaborate t...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
ST Engineering North America
Lockheed Martin
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Defense and Space Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for ST Engineering North America in 2026.
Incidents vs Defense and Space Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
Lockheed Martin has 94.17% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - ST Engineering North America (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ST Engineering North America cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Lockheed Martin (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Lockheed Martin cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
ST Engineering North America
Lockheed Martin
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains an incomplete authentication bypass in encryptPass.json.php that allows unauthenticated attackers to compute valid HMAC tokens using the public site URL and current time. Attackers can forge authentication tokens by computing hash_hmac with the site's base URL as the key and submit arbitrary passwords to receive encrypted hashes, enabling offline precomputation attacks against stolen password databases.
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains a cross-site request forgery vulnerability in the get_domain() and isSameDomain() functions that fail to properly validate referer origins. Attackers can forge requests from sibling subdomains or unparseable long-gTLD origins to perform administrative ObjectYPT writes including live server configuration changes.
WWBN AVideo through 30.0 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MobileManager plugin getConfiguration endpoint that returns sensitive configuration data to unauthenticated visitors. Attackers can send an unauthenticated GET request to plugin/MobileManager/getConfiguration.json.php to obtain TLS private key file paths, socket configuration details, platform version, and debug flags enabling further targeted attacks.
WWBN AVideo fails to validate password recovery token expiration in userRecoverPassSave.json.php, allowing attackers to use expired tokens to reset account passwords indefinitely. Attackers who obtain a recovery token can use it at any time to change the target account's password and gain full account access.
WWBN AVideo (current e01e41ecc and earlier) makes three login-time security controls depend solely on the client-supplied User-Agent header. The isAVideoEncoder()/isAVideoMobileApp() checks match HTTP_USER_AGENT against a hardcoded literal ("AVideoEncoder"/"AVideoMobileApp") with no IP check or shared secret. An attacker who submits valid credentials and sets User-Agent: AVideoEncoder bypasses two-factor authentication, skips brute-force captcha escalation, and avoids being recorded in the login/device audit history. No patch is available at the time of publication.