Comparison Overview
SSTAR

SSTAR
386 Stanley St, Fall River, 02720, US
Last Update: 03/04/2026
Mission – To provide a quality continuum of care and support to all people, especially those affected by addiction, by responding to their mental, physical, emotional and spiritual needs. Vision – Led by our mission, our vision is to participate together as a team in t...

Alberta Health Services
10030 – 107 Street NW, Edmonton, T5J 3E4, CA
Last Update: 06/05/2026
Alberta Health Services (AHS) is proud to be part of Canada’s first and largest provincewide, integrated health system, responsible for delivering health services to more than 4.5 million people living in Alberta, as well as occasionally to some residents of other provi...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

SSTAR







Alberta Health Services






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Hospitals and Health Care Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for SSTAR in 2026.
Incidents vs Hospitals and Health Care Industry Avg (This Year)
Alberta Health Services has 2.91% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - SSTAR (X = Date, Y = Severity)
SSTAR cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Alberta Health Services (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Alberta Health Services cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

SSTAR

Alberta Health Services
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains an incomplete authentication bypass in encryptPass.json.php that allows unauthenticated attackers to compute valid HMAC tokens using the public site URL and current time. Attackers can forge authentication tokens by computing hash_hmac with the site's base URL as the key and submit arbitrary passwords to receive encrypted hashes, enabling offline precomputation attacks against stolen password databases.
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains a cross-site request forgery vulnerability in the get_domain() and isSameDomain() functions that fail to properly validate referer origins. Attackers can forge requests from sibling subdomains or unparseable long-gTLD origins to perform administrative ObjectYPT writes including live server configuration changes.
WWBN AVideo through 30.0 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MobileManager plugin getConfiguration endpoint that returns sensitive configuration data to unauthenticated visitors. Attackers can send an unauthenticated GET request to plugin/MobileManager/getConfiguration.json.php to obtain TLS private key file paths, socket configuration details, platform version, and debug flags enabling further targeted attacks.
WWBN AVideo fails to validate password recovery token expiration in userRecoverPassSave.json.php, allowing attackers to use expired tokens to reset account passwords indefinitely. Attackers who obtain a recovery token can use it at any time to change the target account's password and gain full account access.
WWBN AVideo (current e01e41ecc and earlier) makes three login-time security controls depend solely on the client-supplied User-Agent header. The isAVideoEncoder()/isAVideoMobileApp() checks match HTTP_USER_AGENT against a hardcoded literal ("AVideoEncoder"/"AVideoMobileApp") with no IP check or shared secret. An attacker who submits valid credentials and sets User-Agent: AVideoEncoder bypasses two-factor authentication, skips brute-force captcha escalation, and avoids being recorded in the login/device audit history. No patch is available at the time of publication.