Comparison Overview
Social Security Administration Office of the Inspector General
Social Security Administration Office of the Inspector General
Baltimore, 21235, US
Last Update: 04/04/2026
Thank you for visiting the Social Security Administration (SSA) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) official LinkedIn page. SSA OIG has an enormous responsibility to protect taxpayer dollars. Our mission is to serve the public through independent oversight of Social S...
I WORK FOR SA
200, Victoria Square / Tarndanyangga, Adelaide, 5000, AU
Last Update: 01/04/2026
The OFFICIAL careers page for the South Australian Government. The South Australian Public Sector is the State's largest workforce. We are an employer of choice that reflects the diverse community we serve. Our people are from a range of backgrounds and vocations, fro...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
Social Security Administration Office of the Inspector General
I WORK FOR SA
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Government Administration Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Social Security Administration Office of the Inspector General in 2026.
Incidents vs Government Administration Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for I WORK FOR SA in 2026.
Incident History - Social Security Administration Office of the Inspector General (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Social Security Administration Office of the Inspector General cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - I WORK FOR SA (X = Date, Y = Severity)
I WORK FOR SA cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
Social Security Administration Office of the Inspector General
I WORK FOR SA
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
GNU Savannah Administration Savane through 3.17 uses untrusted data as part of authorization.
- https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/administration/savane.git/tree/frontend/php/file.php?h=release-3.17#n113
- https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/administration/savane.git/tree/frontend/php/file.php?h=release-3.17#n123
- https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48605220
- https://www.fsf.org/news/statement-regarding-gnu-savannah-security-reports
- https://www.hacktron.ai
- https://www.mallory.ai/stories/019ee445-bdd4-7775-93b5-a8faaf5c2eb7
AVideo TopMenu plugin through version 26.0 contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in menu item rendering due to missing output encoding of icon classes, URLs, and text labels. Attackers can inject malicious JavaScript through unescaped menu item fields that execute for all site visitors, potentially stealing session cookies or performing unauthorized actions.
AVideo through version 25.0 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the decryptMessage.json.php endpoint that allows unauthenticated users to decrypt PGP messages. Remote attackers can submit private keys, ciphertext, and passphrases to perform server-side decryption without credentials, exposing key material to logs and enabling resource exhaustion attacks.
AVideo through 29.0 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in the Meet plugin's uploadRecordedVideo.json.php endpoint that derives the target users_id from the uploaded filename without verification. An attacker with knowledge of the Meet shared secret can craft a malicious file upload with a filename containing an arbitrary users_id to invoke passwordless User->login() and establish an authenticated session as any user including admin. Attackers can obtain the Meet shared secret through path-traversal vulnerabilities or timing attacks against checkToken.json.php, then POST a crafted file to uploadRecordedVideo.json.php with a filename like '1-anything.mp4' to hijack admin sessions and gain full account takeover.
AVideo through version 27.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in plugin/Live/test.php that allows authenticated administrators to read arbitrary URLs via the statsURL parameter, which lacks isSSRFSafeURL() validation and accepts requests to private IP ranges and cloud metadata endpoints. Attackers can exploit this by crafting requests to internal services, cloud metadata endpoints like 169.254.169.254, and localhost to retrieve sensitive information including IAM credentials, internal service responses, and network configuration details.