Comparison Overview
SportCaller

SportCaller
Clanwilliam Place, Dublin 2, Dublin, 2, IE
Last Update: 15/06/2026
We provide Free-to-Play Prediction Games and other social products for the sports betting and media industry. Clients include William Hill, Kindred, Stars Group, Paddy Power Betfair, FanDuel, GVC inc Ladbrokes Coral, At The Races and several others. We have clients and ...

Nothing
John Street, London, GB
Last Update: 22/09/2026
Nothing exists to make tech feel exciting again. We’re building a different kind of company, one that puts design, emotion, and human creativity at the heart of everything we do. From the way our products look to how they sound, feel, and function, we care about the de...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

SportCaller







Nothing






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Technology, Information and Internet Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for SportCaller in 2026.
Incidents vs Technology, Information and Internet Industry Avg (This Year)
Nothing has 1.96% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - SportCaller (X = Date, Y = Severity)
SportCaller cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Nothing (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Nothing cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

SportCaller

Nothing
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.